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THE SYSTEMS FALLACY
BERNARD E. HARCOURT1
INTRODUCTION
“Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open
his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his
stomach’s contents—… [these] are methods too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”
Justice Frankfurter, Rochin v. California (1952)2
“Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a
conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality
which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.”
Justice O’Connor, Teague v. Lane (1989)3
The field of criminal law and procedure witnessed a fundamental transformation
over the course of the second half of the twentieth century. Before, the criminal sanction
more often was analyzed through the lens of sovereign power and individual rights.
Punishment often triggered questions about the government’s right to punish and the
balance of power between the state and its citizens. It brought to mind, in Justice
Frankfurter’s words, the history “of the rack and the screw.” Today, the criminal sanction
is analyzed more often in terms of the proper management of “our criminal justice
system.” Consideration of the system’s needs and requirements, or in Justice O’Connor’s
words of the principles “essential to the operation of our criminal justice system,”
influence the analysis and often act as trumps in the decision making.
Undoubtedly, this transformation is the product, in part, of the selective
incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the 1960s and the creation of a more unified
criminal process, as well as the turn to managerialism across American society during the
1
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1970s. But it has also been influenced, importantly, by a new and distinct way of thinking
about the criminal process that was born in the aftermath of World War II: the systems
analytic view. This is the view that the criminal process forms a “system”—namely, the
“criminal justice system”—that must meet certain requirements in order to function
properly. The emergence of this view can be visualized by tracing the usage of the term
“criminal justice system” in federal judicial opinions since the 1960s, as represented by
Figure 1.

Figure 1: Count of Federal Court Opinions that Contain “Criminal Justice System”

The exponential trend is not merely a product of the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights and the corresponding expansion of federal judicial review of state criminal cases.
A very similar trend, with a similar starting point, has taken place at the state level as
well, as evidenced by Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Count of State Court Opinions that Contain “Criminal Justice System”
In effect, the past fifty years witnessed the birth and emergence of the notion of a
“criminal justice system” that, today, has taken on a life of its own. This transformation
has had some positive effects, especially in helping us better understand, in a more
measured way—at a descriptive or positivist level—the functioning of the criminal
process.4 The notion of the “criminal justice system” was extremely useful, beginning
with the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, in identifying the different branches and processes associated with the life course
of criminal cases. It gave us what is, still today, one of the most useful and important
iconographic representations of the criminal process:
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Source: President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,
The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) at p. 8.
But the emergence of the idea of a “criminal justice system” has also had a more
troubling negative consequence—at the normative level—of masking the political nature
of the decisions that courts are forced to make daily in the area of criminal law and
procedure. The “criminal justice system” is, naturally, a metaphor, a purely figurative
system, and practically all of the normative content is determined by the very definition
of the boundaries of the system itself. The normative work is thus already accomplished
sub silentio by setting the scope of the system, by preliminarily determining what is
included or not in that metaphorical system, and by establishing the system’s needs and
requirements. But those scope questions are barely ever scrutinized or debated, generally
are assumed, and most often are delegated—or relegated—to the system experts. As a
result, when lawyers and judges rely on the notion of a “criminal justice system,” they
tend to produce arguments or decisions that privilege what they call the objective needs
or requirements of that system, but that mask the normative judgments that are integral to
imagining the system itself. Those system needs and requirements end up outweighing
other values and interests, and at the same time displace robust debate over the range of
concerns related to the criminal sanction.
The systems analytic view has provided the intellectual framework for a new way
of approaching criminal law and procedure. This article asks how this came about, what
its dangers are, and what the larger ramifications are. It argues that the shift forms part of
a larger development in the area of public policy and, thus, it seeks to place the
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transformation in criminal law and procedure within a broader arc. It explores the central
problem with systems analytic thought and its implications for contemporary law and
policy.
The Systems Fallacy
The systems analytic approach grows out of earlier efforts, at mid-twentieth
century, to systematically and quantitatively evaluate the effectiveness of man-machine
systems. It traces back, originally, to the development of Operations Research by the
British and American military during World War II, a model-driven decisional technique
used to perfect military weapon systems; to the extension of Operations Research-type
logics, during the Cold War, to public policy decision-making more broadly, using the
technique of “Systems Analysis” refined at the RAND Corporation and the Pentagon; and
then to the subsequent imposition by President Lyndon B. Johnson, in 1965, of Planning,
Programming, Budgeting Systems analysis on all government policy-making.
The turn to systems thought has been deeply consequential in the field of law and
public policy. Systems thought is essentially responsible for the dominant role that costbenefit analysis plays today throughout law and policy—or more generally, for the fact
that cost-benefit rationality has become such a dominant form of reasoning in our
contemporary administrative state. It has also transformed the way we think about the
criminal sanction and punishment, in large part because of its influence on criminology
and criminal justice.
A close examination of the attempt to extend the use of systems analytic models
from the narrow military domain of Operations Research to the broader public policy
context, however, reveals a recurring problem centered on the choice of scope of the
analysis or—which is to say the same thing—the choice of scope of the metaphorical
“system” or of the set of alternative policies to compare in a systems analysis. I would
describe the problem, to be exact, as follows:
The analysis of a metaphorical or figurative system, by contrast to a real
or tangible system such as an engine or weapons system, is always going to
involve a decision regarding the scope of the system—of what is in and what is
out of the comparison—and that normative decision will produce analytic
outcomes that will inevitably affect the balance of political values in society. But
that normative decision is always going to be either too large or too small. “Too
large” in the sense that a systems analysis, by definition, will evaluate a
purportedly complete set of fungible policy alternatives—a “whole system”—yet,
in doing so, it inevitably, first, will include policies that may fundamentally distort
and reshape society’s balance of values and, second, will give the false
impression that the “whole system” has been analyzed, thus crowding out or
discounting more alternative policy approaches. “Too small” in the sense that
any partial analysis of a delimited set of alternative policies, short of a full-blown
6

welfare calculus, will distort the decisional outcome by maximizing the wrong
objective, namely the efficiency of one metaphorical system, rather than overall
social welfare. This problem of partiality is particularly acute because of the
scientific character of the method and its tilt in favor of hard systems. These scope
problems become doubly problematic when the systems analysis determines the
outcome and trumps other values—which happens precisely because of the
method’s pretense to comprehensiveness, neutrality, systematicity, rigor, and
objectivity. The pretense to science masks the inescapable value-laden question of
choice of scope, of which set of policies or regulations to include in the
metaphorical system and to analyze, or more broadly, of which figurative system
to study. As a result, social and political values are silently imposed under the
guise of neutral science, preventing full and open public debate regarding the
political choices in question. In the end, systems analysis flips the proper
relationship between method and substance, or to be more exact, between policy
making and politics. Instead of the decision-making method serving to further the
preferences of society, the decisional procedure silently imposes values on
society.
These flaws comprise what I call the “Systems Fallacy”: the mistaken belief that
there could be a non-normative, objective, or neutral—that is to say, scientific—
Archimedean point from which we could establish the proper parameter of the figurative
system in question, or the correct boundary for the set of alternative policies to compare
with each other, that would not bias the decisional outcome and distort our political
values. That assumption is a mistake because the act of defining a metaphorical system,
the very choice of the scope of the policies to compare and analyze, is an inherently
normative enterprise that is value-laden and political in nature, and has effects on the
values in our society. The minute we are inattentive to this core insight, we have moved
one step closer to reproducing the “Systems Fallacy.”
Although there are, admittedly, few pure systems analysts today, the systems
fallacy plagues styles of decision-making that continue to draw on the logic of systems
thought. This is true in the field of criminal law and criminal procedure, notably in cases
where lawyers and judicial decision-makers utilize the notion of the “criminal justice
system.” The mode of reasoning that assumes the existence of a “criminal justice system”
tends to reify its contours, its goals, and its purposes into fixed “needs” that then serve as
trumps in decision-making and determine the outcome without frank discussion of the
other values that are being outweighed.
Similar problems plague some of the more expansive contemporary approaches to
public policy that begin, as in all systems analysis, by collecting a set of promising policy
alternatives and treating them as fungible, rather than addressing up-front the value-laden
choice of scope questions. In the broader area of public policy, many analysts continue to
deploy systems analytic thought—even if not under the explicit rubric of “systems”—that
replicate the problem of the systems fallacy. Here too, the choice of a set of comparable
7

public policies to compare to each other and analyze reproduces a version of the systems
fallacy—since the set of comparable policies function, in fact, to establish a quasisystem.
The systems fallacy also casts its shadow over cost-benefit analysis—which had
its roots in systems analysis and the study of public policy—including more recent
approaches to cost-benefit. Certain contemporary proponents of cost-benefit analysis
have offered chastened and more limited versions of the approach in an effort to address
some of the criticisms that have traditionally been leveled against quantification. They
have, first, recharacterized the analysis as merely a second-best but realistic decisional
tool; second, introduced certain limits to quantification and thereby excluded certain
potentially offensive calculations; and third, urged retrospective and reiterative analyses.
However, even here, when the decisional tool retains the element of a comparison among
policies, there is a remnant of the systems fallacy that continues to plague these
reconstructive projects.
In effect, there is a systems fallacy remainder—one that should make us skeptical
of the current use of reconstructed cost-benefit analysis. The reconstructive project is,
once again, too small—too small, that is, from an internal perspective that accepts all the
premises of the reconstructive project itself. If one actually believes that it is possible to
avoid the problems of quantification and properly engage in this type of reconstructed
cost-benefit analysis, then limiting the analysis to the comparative cost-effectiveness of a
few policies is going to distort overall welfare: the analysis must go larger and fully
address the overall social welfare calculus. The limited nature of the reconstructive
enterprise invariably means that the analysis will seek to maximize the wrong outcome—
namely, narrow efficiency among a small set of policies, rather than social welfare writ
large—and, as a result, likely will have unintended negative consequences. To
foreshadow the argument, society may be beset with a cost-effective solution to one
problem—for instance, increased incarceration as a solution to high crime—that might
only marginally contribute to cross-national crime declines, but have prevented
investments in cancer research which could have discovered a cure for cancer: society
would be much worse off having conducted merely a partial cost-benefit analysis of the
crime problem. In sum, if we believe that these kinds of measurements and quantitative
evaluations are possible, it simply distorts the outcome to select on anything short of
general social welfare. This is particularly problematic where the method presents as
science and favors particular quantifiable results. And of course, from an external
perspective—for those who remain skeptical of such quantification and measurement—
nothing really has been reconstructed in the new cost-benefit approaches.
By recovering the roots of contemporary cost-benefit analysis in systems thought
and reexamining closely the flaws of systems analysis—in effect, by identifying the
“systems fallacy”—it may be possible to better evaluate our ongoing quantitative
practices and better identify their proper limits. Many contemporary attempts at
reconstruction, it turns out, merely replicate, like a crystalline structure, the systems
8

fallacy: they maximize the wrong objective by means of partial equilibriums that cause
distortions, and they fail to appreciate the hidden, value-laden effect of the choice of
scope question.
Let me emphasize that nothing in this article should be interpreted as a criticism
of being systematic. The systems fallacy is a critique of systems analysis and its
derivatives, not of being careful, rigorous, or systematic in one’s thought, logic,
argumentation, etc. On the contrary, the criticism at the heart of this paper—the systems
fallacy—requires rigor and systematicity to understand properly. In fact, the systematicity
of this critique helps to identify better how to resolve or at least best avoid the recurring
traps of systems thought, how to implement a more reflexive analytic approach, and how
to carefully incorporate certain types of benchmarking into policy analysis.
This essay proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I trace the early history of systems
thought from Operations Research to contemporary forms of cost-benefit analysis. In Part
II, I articulate and demonstrate the fallacy of systems thought. I follow that, in Part III,
with an extended discussion of the case of criminal law and procedure. In Part IV, I turn
to a discussion of the larger implications for the field of public policy, and review and
discuss current attempts at reconstructing cost-benefit analyses. Drawing on the critical
analysis, I then draw the implications for the proper use of quantification in public policy
and point to ways forward that avoid the systems fallacy.
I. A HISTORY OF SYSTEMS THOUGHT FROM OPERATIONS RESEARCH TO CBA
At the height of the Cold War in the late 1950s and early 1960s, a decisionmaking technique called Systems Analysis was perfected and began to be applied broadly
to matters of national defense strategy and government policy. The brain child of the
RAND Corporation, Systems Analysis (“SA”) extended the logic of Operations
Research, which had been developed during World War II, from its earlier narrow focus
on weapon systems to broader matters of defense strategy, government, and social policy.
The systems analytic approach, as its name suggests, would focus on a particular social
system, identify the objectives of that particular system, and compare and evaluate the
possible alternative ways of optimizing those objectives.
Systems analysis had a formative impact on government decision-making and on
public policy. In 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara imposed the method
broadly on Department of Defense decision-making, from weapon systems procurement
to national defense strategy, under the rubric of Planning, Programming, Budgeting
Systems analysis or “PPBS.” Within a few years, President Lyndon B. Johnson directed
his budget director to implement PPBS throughout all federal agencies, extending the
reach of systems analytic methods throughout the federal government.
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A series of subsequent executive orders under Presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald
Reagan, and Bill Clinton would further entrench the use of systems analytic techniques,
as would developments in schools of public policy, resulting in the contemporary use of
cost-benefit analysis at the very heart of the executive branch, especially through the
work of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, established in 1980. In this
part, I trace the early history of the expansion of Operations Research as it grew to
become known as Systems analysis and PPBS.
A. OPERATIONS RESEARCH
Military weapon systems analysis, or what was originally called Operations
Research or simply “OR,” was developed during World War II as a way to “provide
quantitative aids to defense decision makers” with the goal of “optimizing the operational
employment of existing weapons (or other military) systems.”5 The “distinctive
approach,” according to the Operational Research Society of Great Britain, was “to
develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating measurements of factors such as
change and risk, with which to predict and compare the outcomes of alternative
decisions, strategies or controls.”6 Famous early applications of operations research
included studies of the placement and use of aircraft-detection radar devices and of antisubmarine tactics involving depth-charge explosions in the early phases of the Second
World War.7 Eventually, operations research would apply the same mathematical
algorithms and models to larger management problems, such as the efficient
determination of transportation routes or warehouse stock control.8 From this larger
perspective, operations research can best be understood, again in the words of the
Operational Research Society of Great Britain, as “the attack of modern science on
complex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men,
machines, materials and money in industry, business, government and defense…. The
purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically.”9 The only
question is how to optimize efficiency where the measure of efficiency is clearly defined,
or, as Edward S. Quade of the RAND Corporation would explain, how “to increase the
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efficiency of a man-machine system in a situation where it is clear what ‘more efficient’
means.”10
B. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
During the 1950s, Quade, Alain Enthoven, Charles Hitch, and others at the
RAND Corporation would extend this method of analysis from the narrow field of
Operations Research, where it had originated, to defense strategy more broadly—
essentially, from deciding, for instance, the optimal altitude for a bombing mission to
determining broader nuclear engagement policies. The broader application would become
known as “Systems Analysis” or “SA.” Systems analysis was often confused with OR,
from which it evolved, but it was distinct in several regards. Operations Research tended
to have more elaborate mathematical models and solved lower level problems;11 in
systems analysis, by contrast, the pure mathematical computation was generally applied
only to subparts of the overall problem. Moreover, SA took on larger strategic questions
that implicate choices between major policy options. In this sense, SA was, from its
inception, “less quantitative in method and more oriented toward the analysis of broad
strategic and policy questions, [...] particularly […] seeking to clarify choice under
conditions of great uncertainty.”12
C. THE LOGIC OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
The logic of systems analysis is simple and was depicted, most clearly, in a
RAND model, Figure 1 of Edward Quade’s RAND Report P-3322 on “Systems Analysis
Techniques for Planning-Programming-Budgeting” from March 1966.13 Quade’s
graphics capture best the five key steps of the analytic decision-making method
developed in the 1950s and 60s—a method that privileged quantification, modeling,
statistical analysis, and a cost-benefit approach.
By way of background and motivating the model, the decision-maker had to have
identified a particular problem to address within a particular social sphere—or
“system”—and to have a clear idea of the system’s objectives. With the objectives in
mind, the decision-maker would then set the proper criterion to evaluate different
promising policy alternatives. There would be five steps to the process:

10

Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 3.
Smith, The Rand Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation, 1966, p. 8.
12
Smith, The Rand Corporation; case study of a nonprofit advisory corporation, 1966, p. 8.
13
Edward S. Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting. Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corp., 1966.
11

11

Step 1, the input, is the set of promising policy alternatives, each of which could
possibly advance the objectives of the system. Each alternative policy is then filtered
through a model or a set of models to assess its individual attributes in terms, for
example, of maintenance costs, manpower requirements, communication capabilities, etc.
This produces each policy’s level of effectiveness and cost, which can then be compared
using a metric, “the criterion,” which will turn out, as the output, the relative rank of each
policy compared to the others. The output, in the far right column at step 5, is the correct
ordinal ranking of the policy alternatives—or what is, in effect, a full ranking of “The
ALTERNATIVES in order of Preference.”14
In order to perfect the method, the operation can be reiterated, testing for
sensitivity, questioning assumptions, reexamining objectives, exploring new alternatives,
and tweaking the model again and again:15

14
15
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Edward Quade of the RAND Corporation would present this model, this policymachine—or, in his words, what “is frequently called a cost-effectiveness analysis… or,
alternatively, cost-utility and cost-benefit analyses”16—to federal bureaucrats in a course
titled “Executive Orientation in Planning, Programming, and Budgeting,” sponsored by
the United States Bureau of the Budget and the Civil Service Commission in late
February 1966. “Our purpose,” Quade emphasized, “is to discuss the question of
extending military systems analysis to the civilian activities of the government.”17 Quade
would offer this concise definition of systems analysis:
A systems analysis is an analytic study designed to help a decision maker identify
a preferred choice among possible alternatives. It is characterized by a systematic
and rational approach, with assumptions made explicit, objectives and criteria
clearly defined, and alternative courses of action compared in the light of their
possible consequences. An effort is made to use quantitative methods but
computers are not essential. What is essential is a model that enables expert
intuition and judgment to be applied efficiently.18
As this definition makes clear, there are two connotations to the term “systems”
embedded in systems analysis: first, there is the idea that there exists a subset of practices
16
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and institutions that relate to each other as a virtual “system” and that need to be analyzed
separately from other social practices and institutions. Along this first dimension, the
analysis focuses on a particular figurative or metaphorical system—such as health care or
criminal justice—in order to optimize its functionality. This system is mutually
constitutive of the set of promising alternative policies that are studied. The system and
the set of policies help define each other. Second, there is the notion of “systems
analysis” that involves a particular type of method—one that begins by collecting a set of
promising alternatives, constructs a model, and uses a criterion. This involves the
comparative analysis of promising policies, using quantification, algorithms, and metrics.
Though they can be distinguished, these two connotations are imbricated and are both
integral parts of the systems analytic approach: the central idea, in effect, is to select and
compare a bunch of policies and choose the one that will maximize the functionality of a
figurative system.
D. PLANNING-PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING SYSTEMS
Secretary of Defense McNamara would impose systems analysis under the rubric
of Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems analysis on all military procurement and
defense strategy immediately upon taking office under President Kennedy in 1961. That
first round of expansion—from narrow Operations Research on weapons systems to
broader applications of systems analysis of defense strategy—generated a lot of
resistance within the military establishment, targeted primarily at the controversial figure
of McNamara himself. But, in Quade’s opinion, by 1966 “there ha[d] been substantial
progress, and the years since 1961 have seen a marked increase in the extent to which
analysis of policy and strategy have influenced decisionmakers on the broadest issues of
national defense.”19
President Johnson would expand the reach of the systems analytic method even
further, announcing in a statement to members of his cabinet and heads of federal
executive agencies on August 25, 1965, that he had directed his budget director, Charles
Schultze, to implement the new PPBS method throughout all federal agencies. Johnson
emphasized that the new method would “identify national goals with precision and on a
continuing basis,” help “search for alternative means of reaching those goals most
effectively at the least cost,” and accurately “measure the performance of programs to
insure a dollars worth of service for each dollar spent.”20
This expansion of systems analysis to all governmental decision-making was
significant—or, in Edward Quade’s words, “possibly even more radical” than the earlier
development of Operations Research.21 It carried the possibility of major repercussions.
As Quade explained, alternative policies are not always “obvious substitutes for one
19

Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2.
United States General Accounting Office, Survey of progress in implementing the planningprogramming-budgeting system in executive agencies; report to the Congress, Washington, DC. 1969, p. 4.
21
Quade, Systems analysis techniques for planning-programming-budgeting, 1966, p. 2.
20

14

another,” nor do they always “perform the same specific function.”22 Nevertheless, he
observed, “education, antipoverty measures, police protection, and slum clearance may
all be alternatives in combating juvenile delinquency.”23 Any one of them could be called
for by PPBS analysis. Moreover, systems analytic methods could give us the tools to
decide whether, as Quade noted, “additional money might be better spent on space
exploration or economic opportunity programs”;24 or whether to “reduce unemployment
to less than 2% in two years or add a certain number of miles to the interstate highway
system.”25 In effect, according to its proponents, systems analysis would allow policymakers to put aside partisan politics, personal preferences, subjective values, and
overinflated expectations. As a colleague at RAND and later Secretary of Defense, James
R. Schlesinger, would explain: “[Systems analysis] eliminates the purely subjective
approach on the part of devotees of a program and forces them to change their lines of
argument. They must talk about reality rather than morality.”26 With SA, Schlesinger
argued, there was no longer any need for political wrangling, for value judgments, nor for
practical experience—in effect, no need for Aristotelian virtues such as phronesis, nor for
Machiavellian notions of virtù. The right answer emerged from the machine-model that
evaluates cost and effectiveness; all that was needed was a narrow and precise objective.
E. EXECUTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
As noted, President Johnson was one of the first to impose cost-benefit
accounting on federal agencies. Five years into McNamara’s term at the Pentagon and
building on McNamara’s success, President Johnson embraced PPBS for his entire
administration. “To make this work,” President Johnson emphasized, “will take good
people, the best you now have and the best you can find.”27 (These were, of course, the
best and the brightest). A decade later, President Carter’s executive order, E.O. 12044,
tasked all executive agencies with the duty to conduct economic impact studies of all
major government regulations. President Reagan’s executive order, E.O. 12291, assigned
the responsibility to the Office of Management and Budget, which now oversees and
coordinates the economic impact analyses.28 President Bill Clinton continued in this
tradition with his executive order requiring economic impact analyses of all significant
regulations, E.O. 12866.29
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The recent presidential commission report on NSA surveillance succinctly
narrates the rest of this history to the present:
In 2011, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13563, which renewed
and deepened the commitment to quantitative, evidence-based analysis, and added
a number of additional requirements to improve regulatory review, directing
agencies “to use the best available techniques to quantify anticipated present and
future benefits and costs as accurately as possible” in order to achieve regulatory
ends.
A central component of Executive Order 13563 involves “retrospective analysis,”
meant to ensure not merely prospective analysis of (anticipated) costs and
benefits, but also continuing efforts to explore what policies have actually
achieved, or failed to achieve, in the real world. In our view, both prospective and
retrospective analyses have important roles to play in the domain under
discussion, though they also present distinctive challenges, above all because of
limits in available knowledge and challenges in quantifying certain variables.30
As the report makes clear, the influence of systems analysis continues to the
present even as the method itself continues to be revised and improved. The commitment
to a quantitative, evidence-based, and modeled approach remains strong, although the
form of cost-benefit analysis has been updated and focuses now importantly on
retrospective analysis. These represent new, more chastened approaches to systems
analytic methods. One can see clearly here how systems analysis had shaped the
development of cost-benefit analysis and how it continues to influence contemporary
efforts to refine CBA.

II. THE PROBLEM WITH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Systems analysis begins with a set of fungible, promising policy alternatives that
are viewed as complete or exhaustive. This set of policy alternatives, in one respect,
serves to establish the contours of a metaphorical system, but, in another respect, is itself
chosen based on a preconceived notion of the figurative system’s functions and
objectives. Importantly, the set of purportedly complete promising alternatives are chosen
regardless of the different political values that the policies embody or reflect.
This can be illustrated by Edward Quade’s observation, earlier, that “education,
antipoverty measures, police protection, and slum clearance may all be alternatives in
combating juvenile delinquency.”31 Notice, first, the mutually constitutive nature of the
system and the policies: the system contours (here the juvenile justice system) are going
to set the range of policies that are selected, but at the same time, the range of promising
30
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policy alternatives will shape the scope of that metaphoric system. Notice, second, that
the set of policies is chosen without consideration for the fact that they engage different
political values, such as an educated citizenry and a robust public sphere (“education”),
political and economic equality or equality of opportunity (“antipoverty measures”),
political freedom, security, and civil liberties (“police protection”), as well as urban
politics and planning (“slum clearance”). Notice, third, that the apparently simple and
narrow definition of the system and its objective (combating juvenile delinquency) has
converted the different political values into mere instrumentalities.
The problem with systems analysis is that, first, the simple preliminary act of
choosing the set of promising alternatives defines the contours of the whole system and
performs practically all the normative work, although this is hidden behind a veil of
objectivity and neutrality; second, the set of alternative policies cuts across multiple
social and political values, ideals and visions, and as a result, the policy output, if it is
implemented, will necessarily affect and shape the society we live in; and third, the
method flips politics and policy upside-down, in the sense that the political outcome
becomes the direct product of a scientific analysis that is determined by the very selection
of the promising alternatives. The method has displaced political contestation and
imposed, under the veil of neutral, objective, positivistic science, a mechanism that
produces its own political outcome. The method converts political goods—an educated
citizenry (education), equality (antipoverty measures), and security (police protection)—
into mere levers of public policy, and imposes, under the appearance of neutrality, a new
political condition.
There are, then, two clear moments to the problem: there is first the problem of
the scope of the metaphorical system, of how we have ham-handedly put together or
constructed a system; and there is, secondly, the problem of the system trump, the fact
that we unnecessarily pay tribute to the needs and requirements of the system. The scope
problems, in essence, become doubly problematic precisely when we allow the system
analysis to trump our other social and political values. In effect, systems analysis inverts
the relationship between method and politics, and it does so without normative
assessment. It subsumes social values (such as education, health care, transportation, or
security) to a calculus that converts them into mere instrumentalities of policy decisionmaking. Instead of systems analysis serving as a tool to ensure the proper implementation
of social and political ideals, the method reshapes and distorts those very ideals and
values—“distorts” in the sense that it affects the balance of values in our society without
openly engaging, debating, confronting, or negotiating the very shift in the balance of
ideals that the method brings about.
A. THE SYSTEMS FALLACY
Another way of saying this is that the systems analytic approach mistakenly
assumes that there is a non-normative, objective way to select the proper boundary of a
figurative system, or a neutral way to choose which alternative policies to compare to
each other. This is mistaken because the very act of defining the scope of a figurative
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system and the choice of the policies to compare are inherently normative decisions that
are value-laden and have deep political effects on society. Whether, for instance, we
include the dimension of democratic citizenship in our conception of the “criminal justice
system”—for instance, whether we factor into our analysis the effects of incarceration on
democratic citizenship—will have deep political consequences on the resolution of
questions of criminal law and procedure. But the contours of the criminal justice system
are already set or preset by the experts, and are not subject to political contestation.
Those contours are always, at the same time, too large and too small. Too large in
the sense that those contours will likely include some promising policy alternatives that
would have a significantly distortive effect on our values, such as for instance “slum
clearance” if that were to entail, hypothetically, displacing communities or disrupting
family bonds. Too large also in the sense that the analysis will give off the appearance of
comprehensiveness and make us believe we have considered all the possible options,
when in fact the analysis likely has excluded certain alternative approaches. It has
inevitably crowded out or discounted some approaches, but has done so silently and, in
the process, has made us lose perspective on how narrow our policy space really is. Too
small in the sense that the analysis focuses only on one system among a myriad of other
systems and therefore tries only to maximize the objectives of one subpart of social wellbeing—which can seriously undermine overall welfare. This problem with partiality is
particularly acute because of the scientific trappings of the method and the tilt in favor of
quantifiable variables.
This relates to a number of other problems with systems thought that have been
well articulated by other critics, especially in the contemporary debate over cost-benefit
analysis.32 As many have noted—correctly, I believe—a systems analytic approach
privileges certain kinds of quantifiable interests over other, less quantifiable values. By
selecting more quantifiable objectives and variables (for instance, juvenile delinquency
rates), which the method itself demands, rather than larger social values (for instance,
youth welfare), or even larger social ideals (such as, for instance, freedom or education),
and by focusing exclusively on measurable outcomes, the systems analytic approach
privileges the more quantifiable, measurable, and instrumental factors in the analysis. It is
always going to be those variables that can be measured more easily (such as arrest rates
or convictions or deaths) that are going to be privileged over more qualitative or soft
variables. And the fact is, the more easily measurable, quantifiable, and instrumental
factors tend to be associated with the harder social systems (such as the military or prison
32
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system), rather than education or community stability. As a result, systems analysis itself
has a particular tilt that favors certain types of outcomes. Educational alternatives often
will get short shrift because of the difficulty of assessing their long-term benefits. Poverty
reduction and other “soft” variables will be more difficult to measure in terms of impact
and outcomes. The hard edge of the systems analysis approach simply favors hard
systems.
Another common criticism of systems analytic approaches is that the decision
makers often do not have the skills, background, knowledge, or time to really implement
the type of quantitative analysis necessary to decipher the best alternative, so they tend to
guesstimate or “satisfice” and, in the process, simply confirm their personal biases. This
is the critique expressed by scholars such as Charles Lindblom, who coined the idea that
policy makers just “muddle through,” or Herbert Simon, who coined the term
“satisfice.”33 These critiques raise the problems of bounded rationality, and they too are
undoubtedly correct.34
But I would like to stay focused on what I consider to be the most central problem
of the systems analytic approach: the systems fallacy, namely, the fact that choice of
scope is never neutral, objective or systematic, but inherently normative, and it has deep
political implications that are masked by the purported scientific nature of the method.
Let me demonstrate the systems fallacy using as simple a model as possible so as to avoid
myself introducing values or assumptions into the premises of the analysis.
B. A DEMONSTRATION
Let’s begin with a simple model that assumes, hypothetically, that Americans in
the aggregate would like to distribute their resources in line with their ideals in the
following manner: 50% to education, 35% to health care, and 15% to policing. For those
who prefer to rely on revealed preferences, we could hypothesize that these are actual
budgeted expenditures. And I should emphasize, at the outset, that this particular
distribution is itself, of course, the product of socialization. There is no pre-political
starting point or state of nature. These preferences, naturally, have already been shaped
and constructed: there is a prior history to this distribution. But for purposes of this
simplified demonstration, let’s start the model at one historical moment.
At Time 1, then, we could map this distribution of preferences (call them
“revealed preferences” if you prefer, “budgets,” “utilities,” or “priorities”) and visualize
these preferences by means of the following simple graph:
33
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Police
15%

Health Care

Education

35%

50%

This distribution of goods corresponds, say, to a certain weighting of social values
that puts a priority first on an educated and healthy citizenry (let’s call this liberty), and
secondly on security and orderliness (let’s call this order). Again, to keep it simple and
take only two ideals, we could visualize the relationship as follows. The first values (the
liberty associated with an educated and healthy citizenry) are, hypothetically, twice as
important as the second set (orderliness and security):
Order

Liberty

0%
33%

67%

These distributions reflect our shared political ideals. They are aggregates of
citizens’ (revealed) preferences, naturally, but represent accurately, let’s imagine, the
political condition that is desired by the people. Again, they are not pre-political, they are
just the preferences at Time 1.
a. The Problem with Fungible Policy Alternatives
Now let’s say that we pick a social problem—for instance, crime or juvenile
delinquency—and we decide to take a systems-analytic approach to the problem. As
analysts, we would begin by choosing the corresponding narrow objective—here,
reducing crime or juvenile delinquency—an objective that we can all agree on easily
once the problem has been posited. We then collect the most promising alternatives to
solve the problem. Let’s say, hypothetically, that there are three: (a) investing more in
publicly-funded Head Start programs for toddlers; (b) improving pre-natal health care for
pregnant mothers, increasing drug rehabilitation programs, and investing in rapid
response emergency room care; or (c) increasing the police force. These alternatives are
entirely fungible, in the eyes of systems analysis. Then, we conduct detailed cost-benefit
analysis and we find that a similar monetary investment will have the greatest return if
the third policy, increasing the police force, is adopted. Based on the analysis, we
increase the number of police officers and the police budget to address the social
problem. Now, the distribution of political goods has changed, and our budget, or goods
allocation, looks something like this:
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The redistribution and reallocation of resources, of course, has consequences on
what we are privileging in terms of ideals. We are now investing twice as much in
policing than we were before, and this has the following consequence on the type of
balance of ideals reflected in our society, with order and security now being
proportionally more important than before:
Order

Liberty

0%
57%

43%

By putting aside debate over our values and ideals, and simply focusing on a
narrow objective, systems analysis effectively has reshaped our social landscape and
modified our prevailing values. It has distorted our original preferences and vision—it
has altered the world that we want to live in.
By contrast, a more capacious approach that addresses head-on our initial
preferences would seek to keep the social values as the primary driver of policy
interventions. That would translate, perhaps, in this case, into a combination of programs
that would invest, say, 50% of resources into Head Start programs, 35% into emergency
care improvement, and 15% into increased police—in order to maintain the balance of
values as they were originally, to maintain the earlier balance.
In this sense, systems analysis is inherently “too large” in the sense that the
method begins with a set of promising alternatives that will inevitably distort our political
values. It silently imposes new values under the guise of science and displaces political
contestation with purportedly scientific criteria. By comparing a range of policies, rather
than simply assessing one policy, the method effectively shapes our politics.
b. The Problem of Partial Maximization
At this point, a proponent of systems analysis might respond that it would be easy
to factor in preferences regarding ideals in such a way that the analysis would take full
account of people’s values. Let’s assume that, as a result of the increased investment in
policing, overall social welfare may be lower than what we might have expected from the
crime drop, because of a shared distaste for living in more of a police state; in other
words, the benefits of reduced crime are offset to some degree by the change in police
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landscape. That, the proponent will say, can be factored into the analysis. The analyst
need only include in the model the distaste (disutility) associated with the shift toward a
police state. Preferences along these lines can also be measured and quantified, and made
part of the overall welfare calculus. The problem, in other words, can be addressed easily
by factoring in people’s tastes and preferences—which should have been done from the
beginning, in fact.
Now, if we etch those preferences too deeply into the analysis, then we will
simply be back at square one: We will weight our preferences so strongly that our values
will determine policy outcomes. If the analysis is going to factor in our taste for police
surveillance robustly—as well as all our other tastes for security, for order, for civil
liberties, for equality, for an educated citizenry, and so on—then the model is essentially
rigged to produce the outcomes that reflect our social values and judgments. The analysis
will reproduce the landscape we want to see realized. What becomes unclear, then, is
how deeply to etch our preferences into the model. But the degree of commitment to
ideals, the strength of one’s convictions and values, can also be measured and included in
the model, a proponent might reply. There is no reason to believe that preferences are
etched in stone and that there can never be any trade-offs. A new social problem may
have effects on the vision that we have for society.
So, proponents of systems analytic methods might argue, after having
incorporated those preferences into the model, a systems analytic approach can find real
efficiencies that will actually result in increased welfare and greater utility overall. For
instance, systems analysis might find efficiencies, say, by using police to address juvenile
crime, that will outweigh the disutility and that would thereby allow us to invest savings
into education and poverty-reduction. Even though there may be a shift in ideals, a
proponent may argue, Americans will value the end state more. They will gain some
orderliness proportionally to liberty, but will be happier overall based on their own tastes,
preferences, or utilities.
This is the welfare economist’s response—a type of response consistent, for
example, with Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell’s thesis in Fairness versus Welfare
(2002).35 In fact, Kaplow and Shavell say precisely this. As they write and emphasize,
“The conception of individuals’ well-being that we consider, in the tradition of welfare
economics, is a comprehensive one. It encompasses not only the direct benefits that
individuals obtain from the consumption of goods and services, but also individuals’
degrees of aesthetic fulfillment, their feelings for others, and anything else that they
value. What factors are included in well-being—and with what weight—is understood
subjectively, in terms of what actually matters to individuals.”36

35

Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University,
2002) (previously published in Harvard Law Review 114 (2001): 961–1388).
36
Louis Kaplow and Steve Shavell, “Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Principle, Preferences,
and Distributive Justice,” Journal of Legal Studies 32:331-362 (January 2003), pp. 332-333.

22

As if anticipating the argument here (section a, supra), Kaplow and Shavell add:
“An implication of our broad definition is that even tastes for fairness are included: Just
as an individual might derive pleasure from art, nature, or fine wine, so might an
individual feel better with the knowledge, for example, that vicious criminals receive
their just deserts. This view, under which tastes for fairness are counted with a weight to
be determined empirically, based on the actual weight, if any, that individuals place on
such tastes, must be sharply distinguished from the view of notions of fairness as
independent evaluative principles, which is the subject of our critique.”37 In other words,
welfare economics can incorporate peoples’ tastes, preferences and values regarding
social and political ideals—and still optimize, i.e. shift policies around in order to find
efficiencies that can be reinvested in other political ideals.
This is undoubtedly right, at least at a theoretical level—or, at a minimum, I am
perfectly willing to assume that it is right. But the problem is, even from a welfare
economist’s perspective, that systems analysis is then maximizing the wrong thing: it is
trying to resolve one particular social problem, rather than trying to maximize general
social welfare. In the process, there is absolutely no way to know whether the resolution
of that particular systemic problem has increased or decreased overall welfare, or whether
there are other policy alternatives regarding other social problems that would do better at
promoting overall social welfare. In other words, from an internal perspective—internal
to welfare economics—systems analysis is dangerous: it is trying to optimize the wrong
objective.
From a social welfare point of view, then, it is crucial not to engage in partial
welfare analyses by focusing on one figurative system: that would simply distort overall
welfare.38 Another way to say this is that systems analysis does not address the question
of how a particular social problem, or social system for that matter, becomes the focus of
our problem-solving. The problem of crime was turned into a major national issue at a
37
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particular moment in history—in about 1964, during Barry Goldwater’s presidential
campaign—and would become a key campaign issue for Richard Nixon. In part as a
backlash to the Civil Rights movement, and for other reasons as well—including the rise
of the anti-War and other social movements, racial conflict, and increased crime rates—
crime would become in the 1960s a social problem that would trump others—housing,
poverty, public health, etc.39 But there was nothing natural or obvious about that.
Illiteracy, malnourishment, poverty, racism, inequality, homelessness, etc. could also
have remained or become more pressing social issues.
In other words, we construct, we produce social problems, we render visible
certain social issues, often through a crisis—and we keep invisible other social
problems—in a way that then puts onto our counting table particular costs and benefits. It
is in the production of problems as problems that we produce the possibility of shifting
social values. We render visible one problem, while other problems remain invisible and
illegible. In the process, we load the systems analysis with very specific concerns that
have identifiable implications. We shape the balance of our ideals by means of problem
creation. The only way to do systems analysis properly, without causing systemic
distortion, is to do general welfare analysis at the highest and broadest level. Barring that,
the analysis is inevitably going to insert error.
In this sense, systems analysis is always “too small” in the sense that the partial or
delimited analysis of a system, short of a full-blown welfare calculus, will distort the
decisional outcome. It maximizes the wrong objective, namely the efficiency of one
metaphorical system rather than overall welfare. Here again, the pretense to
comprehensiveness masks the value-laden, inevitably normative choice of scope. And it
is that pretense to objectivity, as well as the tilt in systemic thought that favors hard
variables, that is particularly problematic in this case. It produces not only an internal
preference for policies that are associated with harder systems, such as, for instance, the
“criminal justice system” rather than the “educational system,” but it manages to
persuade more forcefully because of its apparent rigor and systematicity. It has a
rhetorical power that is often unmatched, which is precisely what then allows systems
needs and requirements to trump other social and political values. The method ends up
being self-reinforcing. This is particularly the case with the more established systems,
such as, precisely, the “criminal justice system.”
III. THE CASE OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The field of criminal law and procedure provides a striking illustration. Systems
analytic logics exert significant influence on the field and, as a result, the problem of the
systems fallacy is acute. This is in large part due to the influence of Operations Research
on the study of criminal justice: it is fair to say that the systems analytic approach shaped
39
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the field of criminal justice and is largely responsible for crystalizing the notion of a
“criminal justice system” that, today, grounds practically all research and practice in the
area. Because of this, systems analytic logics continue to play an important role in the
field of criminal law and criminal procedure.
Precisely when systems analysis was in crescendo in the 1960s, a number of
judges and legal scholars began to embrace a systems analytic approach to judicial
decision-making and legal reasoning. It is an approach that assumes the existence of a
“criminal justice system,” with particular functions and objectives, and that orients itself
toward optimizing those systemic objectives. The approach can take either of two forms:
(1) what I would call an “internal” approach in which the judicial decision-maker views
him or herself and the surrounding legal structures (the legal institutions and practices) as
an integral part of the “criminal justice system” and consequently tries to optimize the
functioning of that integrated system with the objective, say, of controlling crime,
improving the efficient management of populations, or otherwise enhancing the
functionality of the system; and (2) what I would call an “external” form in which the
judicial decision-maker views him or herself and other legal actors as outsiders to the
“criminal justice system” and consequently defers to the actors within the system (such as
the police, corrections officials, parole board, etc.).
The reliance on these two styles of reasoning, however, produces the systems
fallacy. These styles of reasoning privilege systems-related interests, particularly the
more quantifiable ones, over the competing concerns that are at issue in the context of the
criminal sanction, and do so under the guise of neutrality and objectivity. In elevating
systems-related interests over other values, they produce a false dichotomy between
objective system needs and subjective values that is fundamentally corrosive to the
decision-making process and to the larger social outcomes, because they prevent a full
articulation, open discussion, and comprehensive weighing of the values at the heart of
criminal law and procedure. By thinking critically about the technical weaknesses of
systems analysis, we may be able to move past these styles of reasoning toward a more
capacious and promising way to theorize and resolve matters of crime and punishment: a
way forward that would effectively discard the misleading notion of a “criminal justice
system” in order to embrace a more reflexive consideration of the values that are
implicated by the criminal sanction.
In order to appreciate this, it may be important first to trace the history of the
influence of systems analysis on the field, starting with the influence on criminal justice.
A. THE IMPACT OF SYSTEMS THOUGHT IN CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
During the Progressive Era, reformers had already gravitated toward a crude
notion of “systems,” especially with regard to the treatment of juvenile offenders. One of
the first uses of the term “criminal justice system” occurred in a 1939 report on Youth in
the Toils, a study conducted on behalf of The Delinquency Committee of the New York
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City Boys Bureau, an organization that addressed the problems of homeless youth. In the
immediately following years, the expression “criminal justice system” would be used in
several other publications, each time to refer again to the issue of juvenile delinquency.
The expression was used, for instance, in a 1941 issue of Federal Probation,40 a 1942
issue of the American Bar Association Journal titled “The Criminal Youth Problem,”41
and a 1942 article in Law and Contemporary Problems, “Existing Provisions for the
Correction of Youthful Offenders.”42
But these loose references to a “criminal justice system” would gain new analytic
power with the emergence of systems analysis, such that, by the second half of the
twentieth century, the field of criminal justice began to be understood as a relatively
enclosed system in which particular sets of actors (policemen, prosecutors, judges,
probation officers, correctional guards, wardens, parole board members, etc.) operate a
defined set of institutions (police, courts, jails, prisons, parole supervision, etc.) to
promote a distinct set of systems objectives (crime control, population management,
service needs, etc.) and to produce a functioning structure of criminal justice.
Systems analysis played an important role in crystalizing the notion of a “criminal
justice system.” A genealogic link can be traced at both the individual and institutional
levels. Alfred Blumstein, for instance, a towering figure in American criminology,
himself began as an operations researcher and was president of the Operations Research
Society of America (ORSA)—and tellingly, his appointment at Carnegie Mellon is as
University Professor of Urban Systems and Operations Research.
In a fascinating memoire titled “An OR Missionary’s Visits to the Criminal
Justice System,”43 Blumstein refers to himself as an “OR Missionary” and traces his
missionary activities in the area of criminal justice. Reflecting back on his trajectory,
Blumstein would write that “the missionary function was an important role of OR, and so
I encouraged OR folks to look to missionary opportunities. That was well before I
immersed myself fully in missionary activity with the criminal justice system.”44
Blumstein viewed his “missionary role,” in his own words, as “bringing OR perspectives
to the ‘heathens’ in a particular domain—those who have not yet adopted quantification,
modeling, system perspectives, and planning that characterize the hallmark of OR.”45
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Blumstein was not alone. As he observed, “there have been many other OR
people, particularly Arnold Barnett, Jon Caulkins, Jan Chaiken, Peter Greenwood,
Richard Larson, and Michael Maltz, who have had their own experiences with the CJS
[criminal justice system], and many of them have received honors from the OR
community as well as the CJS community.”46 A lengthy and useful review of OR
contributions to the criminal justice system is provided in Michael Maltz’s 1994 chapter
on “Operations research in studying crime and justice: Its history and
accomplishments.”47
But one could also trace an institutional genealogy, located in New York City
during the 1970s.
a. The New York City RAND Institute
John Lindsay was elected mayor of New York City in 1966 and took office
promising to reform city government with more efficient cost-benefit budgeting—
specifically, with Planning-Programming-Budgeting System analysis. Mayor Lindsay
intended to bring the new PPBS technique to New York City “to improve budgeting and
operations.”48
At the time, violent crime in the City was on the rise.49 The crime problem was
particularly acute in public housing projects and so-called “welfare hotels.”50 Mayor
Lindsay invited the RAND Corporation to develop new strategies to reduce and prevent
crime; and within a few years, Lindsay had helped establish the New York City RAND
Institute as a joint project of the City and RAND Corporation.51
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In January 1968, Mayor Lindsay hailed New York City’s new arrangement with
the RAND Corporation to tackle crime prevention in the City:
This agreement will greatly assist our introduction into city
agencies of the kind of streamlined, modern management
thinking that Robert McNamara applied in the Pentagon
with such success during the past seven years. ... I regard
this as the most important development in the search for effectiveness in city government in many, many years.52
With crime on the rise, the primary focus of the RAND satellite would be the
New York City Police Department. At a news conference on January 8, 1969, Mayor
Lindsay and Henry Rowen, the president of RAND and previously Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense under McNamara, unveiled the new project with great fanfare: an
initial contract with the City worth $607,000, a Madison Avenue office “staffed by 40
economists, sociologists, engineers, cost analysts and other researchers,” and four focus
areas, the most important of which would be the NYPD (the other three being the fire
department, housing administration, and health services).53 Everyone expected a tight
collaboration. As the New York Times suggested, “The city’s relationship with RAND
would be similar to the one RAND has had with the Air Force since World War II”54—
one could hardly imagine a tighter relationship than that.
Once established, the New York City RAND Institute immediately began to
tackle the crime problem with a number of reports and recommendations about how to
improve the efficiency of police services. The first series of reports were extremely
narrow operations research-type reports, with titles such as “A Hypercube Queueing
Model for Facility Location and Redistricting in Urban Emergency Services” (Richard C.
Larson, R-1238-HUD, 1973), “Response of Emergency Units: The Effects of Barriers,
Discrete Streets, and One-Way Streets” (Richard C. Larson, R-675-HUD, 1971),
“Allocation of Emergency Units Response Areas” (Jan M. Chaiken, P-4745, 1971),
“Analysis of the Night and Weekend Arraignment Parts in the Bronx and Queens
Criminal Courts” (John B. Jennings, R-1236-NYS, 1973), “Using Simulation To Develop
and Validate Analytical Emergency Service Deployment Models” (Edward Ignall, Peter
Kolesar, and Warren Walker, P-5463, 1975), and “Determining the Travel Characteristics
of Emergency Service Vehicles” (J. Hausner, R-1687-HUD, 1975). These studies applied
complex mathematical models to examine minute dispatching and routing efficiencies.
They resembled the classic early applications of operations research outside the military
to matters such as determining “how Post Office pick-up trucks should be routed to
collect mail from deposit boxes, or whether computers should be rented or purchased, or
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what type of all-weather landing system should be installed in new commercial
aircraft.”55
Gradually and interspersed in these operation research-type reports, there emerged
a number of systems analysis-type studies. The contours of the approach were captured
well by the New York Times in 1968 when it defined it as the “method of analyzing a
problem by listing the desired objectives and available resources and then detailing alternative methods of using the resources to accomplish the objectives.”56 RAND’s
systems analytic studies did indeed focus on a narrow objective—preventing crime—and
they would embrace a wide range of different alternative policies to try to determine the
most efficient. And so, within a few years, with crime on the rise and a ready method at
hand, RAND and the NYC RAND Institute were deeply involved in problem-solving
crime in public housing using a systems analysis approach.
b. The 1971 Liechenstein RAND Report
An illustrative study was Michael I. Liechenstein’s report issued in June 1971,
which addressed the objective of, as the title suggests, “Reducing Crime in Apartment
Dwellings: A Methodology for Comparing Security Alternatives.”57 The study, which
was sponsored by Mayor Lindsay’s Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, analyzed
techniques for improving security in New York City Housing Authority buildings. It took
a “broad operational view of a security system,”58 analyzing fifteen alternative policies,
including tenant training and education, tenant patrols, tenant qualifications to live in the
projects, extended recreational opportunities for teenagers, rent rebates, elaborate
building-entry restrictions, locked lobbies, intrusion detectors, weapon detectors,
surveillance, and increased police or guard manning.
In order to compare the alternatives, the study developed “effectiveness criteria”
and then coupled those to “compatibility and cost criteria to derive estimates of an overall
figure of merit (e.g., the ration of effectiveness-to-cost with a constraint on either
minimum effectiveness or maximum cost).”59 In addition to the security effectiveness and
compatibility criteria, the report also listed cost-benefit criteria: “Research and
development cost (equipment, maintenance, administration before production); Capital
cost (equipment, maintenance, and administrative costs during production); Operating
cost (equipment, maintenance, administration costs during use); Scrap value (residual
value at end of use); Expected total benefit.”60
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The report generated a graph of the cost-effectiveness of all fifteen alternatives:

The fifteen different measures ranged the political spectrum—from education for
low-income project tenants on issues of criminal offending, preventive measures, and
self-defense, to providing recreational facilities for poor urban teenagers, to offering
subsidies and other positive financial incentives to poor tenants, to raising admissibility
and tenure standards for housing assistance, to increasing police presence. They included
everything from education, to recreation, to target-hardening, to policing. Based on the
quantitative analysis, the report concluded that the most cost-effective preventive
measure was an increased police force and more guard-manning.
This was, one could say, the pinnacle of systems analytics in relation to the
criminal justice system. For RAND, the “criminal justice system” was a natural space for
systems analytics. To be sure, part of the attraction of systems analysis talk at an
institution like the New York City RAND Institute was an artifact of the consultancy
business; and the NYC RAND Institute in fact folded in 1975 amidst significant—I might
add, ironic—controversy over Lindsay’s profligate spending on consultants.61 But
nevertheless, the notion of “the criminal justice system” would stick and the systems
analytic approach would become increasingly important. It would lead to a whole set of
institutions and think tanks, across the political spectrum, that would take as its object the
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criminal justice system—such as the Vera Institute of Justice, the Urban Institute, the
Institute for Law and Justice, the Police Foundation, the Police Executive Research
Forum, to name a few. These organizations would centrally embrace the notion of
“systems.” The Vera Institute’s very logo is “Making justice systems fairer and more
effective through research and innovation.”62 And systems analytic types of methods and
reasoning would continue to develop, including importantly in cases like COMPSTAT in
New York City.
Today, the idea that there is a “criminal justice system” has become so dominant
that practically everyone thinks about crime and punishment through a systems analytic
lens and uses the language and logic of systems in a natural and reflexive way. We are so
deeply entrenched in this view of criminal justice that it is practically redundant to
observe that we conceive of the area in terms of a system. It is practically impossible
today to work or speak in the area without referring to it as the “criminal justice system.”
The systems approach that crystalized in the 1960s dominates our way of thinking about
the field today.
B. THE INFLUENCE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
The influence of systems analysis in the field of law writ large is a complicated
matter that would require lengthy treatment and would lead us astray from the focus of
this discussion—namely, criminal law and criminal procedure. At the broadest level, the
idea that the field of law could be usefully understood through the lens of a “legal
system” percolated through Anglo-American legal thought for centuries.63 The use of
biological systems metaphors was prominent in the nineteenth century on the Continent.64
And in the twentieth century, the metaphor of systems continued to play an important
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role in legal thought, as reflected in the writings of Niklas Luhmann and the emergence
of autopoesis theory,65 which drew in large part on the work of Talcott Parsons.66
But in the specific legal field of criminal law and criminal procedure, systems
analytics had a distinct influence because of its direct link to the “criminal justice
system.” Just as systems analysis began to crystalize the notion of a “criminal justice
system,” a distinct style of judicial decision-making and legal reasoning based on a
systems analytic approach would emerge and begin to encroach upon an earlier way of
thinking about punishment as a question of sovereign right.
Here too, one could trace a genealogy that would link particular individuals and
institutions. The former dean at Harvard Law School, James Vorenberg, who was a
formidable figure in criminal law and procedure, worked closely with Alfred
Blumstein—respectively, as Executive Director and as Director of Science and
Technology of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice—to introduce systems analysis into criminal law reform.67 The
65
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1967 President’s Commission conducted a broad-ranging analysis of the state of the
American criminal justice system,68 and its final report, “The Challenge of Crime in a
Free Society,” represented an early model of the application of OR to criminal justice.
One of the Commission report’s main accomplishments was precisely to establish “a
‘systems point of view’ as a basic frame of reference, and a better understanding of the
‘hydraulic’ nature of that system.”69
As Charles F. Wellford suggests, Vorenberg undoubtedly was a large influence on
the Commission’s decision to implement systems analysis, as was “the decision of the
Attorney General and Secretary of Defense to allow the Institute for Defense Analysis,
and in particular Alfred Blumstein, to be a part of the President’s Commission.”70 Also
important was Harvard Professor Lloyd Ohlin, who had applied systems thought to the
American Bar Foundation criminal justice surveys of the 1950s and to much of his work
on juvenile justice, prediction, and corrections.71
In large part, the systems approach was introduced in the 1967 President’s
Commission as an alternative to experimentation.72 As Wellford documents, “Vorenberg,
Ohlin, Blumstein, and others emphasized the role of [systems] research” because
“experimentation is frequently impossible” in the criminal justice arena. Wellford
continues:
So the creation of a model of the system, one that could be manipulated to
determine effects, would be a critical first step in understanding how
improvements could be achieved. The flow chart was a first step in identifying the
components of the system which could be manipulated to determine their effect
68
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on the remainder of the system. From this goal of improvement, and in
recognition of the difficulty of the experimentation, the Commission moved to
introduce not only a concept of criminal justice, but a methodology of system
analysis including mathematical modeling as a way to identify and evaluate
effective changes.73
The 1967 President’s Commission is a landmark for locating criminal justice
within a “system” and for making recommendations based on the functions and
objectives of the system. Systems analysis features prominently in the law reform project
in two central respects: first, systems analysis is the method by which the criminal justice
system, as a “system,” is analyzed and upon which the recommendations are based. The
Commission outlines, using as a visual aid complex flow-charts that recall early RAND
reports, the entirety of the criminal justice system, the modus operandi of its individual
subparts, the relative success of each part’s performance, its personnel and resource
allocation, and recommendations for how institutional practices, resources and personnel
might be altered to increase success. Second, as part of these recommendations, the
Commission calls for the future implementation of systems analysis at the local level—
the level of the subpart—in order to assess future functional needs. Vorenberg,
Blumstein, Ohlin, and their colleagues used systems analysis in order to diagnose
systemic problems of the criminal justice system, and subsequently recommended that
more such analysis be applied in order to continue the practice of diagnosis and the
specific kinds of prescription it tends to generate.
Dean Vorenberg also headed up, with his colleague Paul Bator, a distinguished
study group of the American Law Institute on criminal justice.74 That commission was
the first survey of its kind in the United States, and it sought to map out the various levels
of the American criminal justice system (and “non-system,” as its authors sometimes
termed it).75
There were, of course, others with OR backgrounds. Associate Justice John M.
Harlan II, who was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1955 and would influence much of
the Warren Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence, had “headed up the Eighth Air
Force Operations Analysis Section (OAS)” during World War II as part of an effort to
introduce OR into U.S. Air Force tactics.76 Nicholas Katzenbach, who served as Attorney
73
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General during President Lyndon Johnson’s administration, headed the Office of Legal
Counsel in the Kennedy administration, and taught law at Yale and then Chicago,77 also
had an OR background and would serve as chair of the report of the 1967 President’s
Commission.78
Although it would be possible to dig deeper into these personal and institutional
genealogies, the influence of systems analysis on criminal law and procedure was
probably more indirect: Systems analysis was in the air in the 1960s and it was having a
direct influence on criminology and the study of the “criminal justice system.” At exactly
the same time, there began to be a distinct style of judicial decision-making that rested on
a systems analytic approach. This style of reasoning would take two distinct forms.
a. The Internal Approach: Models of the Criminal Justice System
In one form, the judicial decision-maker or legal scholar considers criminal law
and procedure adjudication to be part of the “criminal justice system” and attempts to
maximize the objectives of the system.
i) Herbert Packer’s “Models” of the Criminal Process
Herbert Packer would lead the way in identifying this style of reasoning by
describing, in one of the most celebrated (at the time and still today, for many) theoretical
interventions, two dominant “models” of constitutional criminal procedure. First
presented in his article “Two Models of the Criminal Process,”79 published in 1964, and
then further developed in his book The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,80 published in
1968, Packer described two competing models of judicial reasoning in criminal law and
procedure: a crime control model, oriented toward the goal of reducing crime, and a due
process model, oriented toward the goal of protecting individual rights.
Although Packer did not explicitly use the term “systems analysis,” the models
that he identified were unquestionably systems analytic. In his own language and analysis
of the crime-control model, for instance, Packer would expressly deploy systems
discourse. He wrote, for instance, that “By ‘efficiency’ we mean the system’s capacity to
apprehend, try, convict, and dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders whose
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offenses become known.”81 Modeling itself, from Packer’s perspective, was a form of
systems thought. As he wrote:
We need to detach ourselves from the welter of more or less connected details that
make up an accurate description of the myriad ways in which the criminal process
does operate or may be likely to operate in midtwentieth-century America so that
we can begin to appraise the system as a whole in terms of its capacity to deal
with the variety of substantive missions we confide to it.82
In this sense, Packer’s Limits of the Criminal Sanction proceeds from a systems
analytic framework. The project starts by identifying a social problem. In fact, the very
first paragraph of the book opens with an articulation, clarification, and identification of
the “social problem” that the book addresses: “the problem of trying to control anti-social
behavior by imposing punishment on people found guilty of violating rules of conduct
called criminal statutes.”83 With that social problem in mind, Packer then turns to a form
of modeling. Simple modeling, no equations, but modeling nonetheless. The idea is to
“begin to see how the system as a whole might be able to deal with the variety of
missions we confide to it” and, for this, the approach he takes is “to abstract from reality,
to build a model.”84 Packer in fact builds two models, which represent, he suggests, the
two poles or extreme points of the “two value systems that compete for priority in the
operation of the criminal process.”85 Packer presents his models as “an attempt to give
operational content to a complex of values underlying the criminal law.”86
The crime control model, Packer explains, “is based on the proposition that the
repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function to be performed by
the criminal process.”87 In other words, the system objective is crime reduction. This
clearly represents a systems analysis of criminal law and procedure that has as its
objective crime reduction. The actors in the models include “lawmakers, judges, police,
prosecutors, defense lawyers.”88 And the model rests on an efficiency analysis: “the
Crime Control Model requires that primary attention be paid to the efficiency with which
the criminal process operates to screen suspects, determine guilt, and secure appropriate
dispositions of persons convicted of crime.”89 The criterion of efficiency has to do with
the ability of the process to catch and convict large numbers of offenders.
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For this, Packer notes, “There must then be a premium on speed and finality.
Speed, in turn, depends on informality and on uniformity; finality depends on minimizing
the occasions for challenge.”90 Packer explains:
The image that comes to mind is an assembly-line conveyor belt down which
moves an endless stream of cases, never stopping, carrying the cases to workers
who stand at fixed stations and who perform on each case as it comes by the same
small but essential operation that brings it one step closer to being a finished
product, or, to exchange the metaphor for the reality, a closed file.91
The applications of the crime control model that Packer discusses make clear that
this is systems analysis. So, for instance, in discussing the question of police misconduct
attendant to arrests, Packer rehearses the systems analytic approach. Packer collects and
evaluates the most promising alternatives and essentially ranks them ordinally: the “most
appropriate” policy ends up being discipline of the offending officer; the second
alternative is civil remedies against the police officer; and the bottom (in this case,
unacceptable) alternative is suppression of the evidence or dismissal of the case.92 Packer
applies the same kind of analysis, under the crime control model, to issues ranging from
investigatory stops under the Terry stop-and-frisk rule93; the length of detention and
interrogation prior to consulting an attorney or notifying family94; how coercive
interrogations may be95; the Miranda rule96; electronic surveillance97; and all the steps
between charging decisions and pre-trial detention to the determination of guilt, to
appeals and post-conviction review.
By contrast to this first model, the due process model that Packer develops is
oriented toward a cluster of liberal legal objectives. “Its ideology,” Packer tells us, “is
composed of a complex of ideas, some of them based on judgments about the efficacy of
crime control devices, others having to do with quite different considerations.”98 Some of
these quite different considerations include the importance of factual accuracy, the value
of equality (even for indigent defendants), and a certain skepticism regarding the morality
and the utility of punishment. The result is a very different model: “The Due Process
Model resembles a factory that has to devote a substantial part of its input to quality
control. This necessarily cuts down on quantitative output.”99
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Whether the due process model is, strictly speaking, a “model” by systems
analysis standards is perhaps debatable, in large part because the objectives are so much
less quantifiable and so much more diverse. The due process approach resembles much
more a collection of standards than a model per se. Even Packer draws a distinction
between the positive or what he calls “affirmative” nature of the crime control model and
the “negative model” of due process.100 We could imagine that we have here, sensu
stricto, one systems analysis approach (which explains why Packer also views the crimecontrol model as ultimately resting on administrative and legislative authority) versus a
more legalistic approach that is based on judicial oversight (and here, Packer also places
this second model under the authority of judicial power).101
But this does not matter. The crime control model is squarely systems analytic,
and ultimately Packer himself adopts a crime-control systems analytic view—or what he
calls an “Integrated Theory of Criminal Punishment” that includes two maxims, the first
of which is that “It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for punishment that it is
designed to prevent the commission of offenses.”102 Packer also includes a
blameworthiness condition in order to prevent the punishment of innocent people or
unjust punishment103; the notion of culpability is, in his words, a “limiting principle, not a
justification for action.”104
As Packer states, the goal should be crime reduction: he adopts as his “rationale”
for the criminal sanction—i.e., as his objective and guiding principle—“one that pursues
the central goal of prevention of socially undesirable behavior, as limited by restrictions
of culpability.”105 In the third portion of the book, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction,
which consists of material that was not included in the original article on “Two Models of
the Criminal Process,” Packer emphasizes that:
The function of the criminal sanction is to help prevent or reduce socially
undesirable conduct through the detection, apprehension, prosecution, and
punishment of offenders. This is the only function that its rationale permits and
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this is the only function with which its processes are adequately equipped to
deal.106
This is, in the end, a systems analytic approach.107 And it was received as such.
Packer’s admirers and detractors recognized the systematic and analytic dimensions of
his intervention.108 And note, of course, that the timing is perfect: Packer develops his
models at the height of systems analytic thinking, in the mid-1960s, when McNamara
was using PPBS at the Pentagon and President Johnson was imposing the method on the
full federal government.
The same would be true for the leading critic of Packer’s models, John Griffiths,
who published in the Yale Law Journal in 1970 an article entitled “Ideology in Criminal
Procedure or A Third ‘Model’ of the Criminal Process.”109 Griffiths’ argument was that
Packer’s two models were actually both part of a single “battle model” of criminal
procedure, and he proposed, for argument’s sake, a different model of the criminal
process, what he called the “Family Model.” But even Griffiths’s alternative model can
be interpreted through systems analytics: namely, as pursuing a family-oriented objective
within a systems theory.
ii)

Supreme Court Adjudication

In contrast to Packer’s stylized crime control model which utilizes a systems
analytic method in the strict sense—comparing alternatives, ranking them, and endorsing
the most efficient mechanisms for crime control—judicial decision-making that adopts
systems analytics tends to do so more informally. The act of adjudication—especially the
way in which issues make their way to the courts and the types of decisions that courts
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are generally asked to perform (i.e. whether a promising alternative is constitutional or
not)—puts a certain limit on a judge’s ability to engage in full-blown systems analysis.
As a result, judges who embrace a systems analytic approach tend to focus on the
later stages of system analysis: they will articulate, first, one or more overarching
objectives for the criminal justice system—such as, for instance, crime control, security
management, or the proper and efficient functioning of the criminal justice system—but
then fast forward to the final columns of the analysis and declare that the particular legal
practice at issue is the most efficient or a fully efficient and proper way to satisfy the
system’s objective. The analysis is somewhat truncated. It rarely engages in rigorous
empirical analysis, data collection, modeling, or quantitative analysis. But it functions in
the same way, especially at the tail end, and adopts the language and style of system
analysis.
Several of the landmark Warren Court opinions in criminal procedure reflect this
internal systems analytic approach. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona110 is an
interesting illustration. Chief Justice Warren’s opinion for the Court integrates a systems
analysis, not as to the narrow legal question at issue—namely, whether the Fifth
Amendment applies to custodial interrogation at the police precinct—but as to the
remedy, once the legal issue has been resolved. In other words, once Chief Justice
Warren has made the strictly legal decision at the heart of Miranda—namely, once he
decides to extend the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination from the
courtroom into the police custodial setting111—he then turns, effectively, to systems
analytic reasoning to determine the remedy. Though he does not, in fact, collect all
possible “promising alternatives,” he does evaluate and endorse, on effectiveness
grounds, the specific framework of Miranda warnings—and then encourages Congress to
do the rest:
It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the
privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of their
creative rule-making capacities... We encourage Congress and the States to
continue their laudable search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
rights of the individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must be
observed.112
Right here, Chief Justice Warren embeds a partial systems analysis within his
remedial discussion. His discussion sounds in line with systems analysis: it sets out a
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clear objective, and then evaluates different options, keeping the functionality of the
system at the heart of the discussion:
Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence and
speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated
warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself
suffice to that end among those who most require knowledge of their rights. A
mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to accomplish that
end….
Chief Justice Warren then evaluates different promising alternatives as if he is
putting them through a model, trying to decipher their individual attributes, in order to
compare and rank them:
The presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant
subsidiary functions as well. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the
assistance of counsel can mitigate the dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer
present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced, and if
coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court. The
presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully
accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the
prosecution at trial.113
Notice the systems functionality discourse: Warren’s analysis is aimed at ensuring
that the system functions properly and effectively—and promises to leave it in place
unless and until Congress would provide for, essentially, an equal or higher ranking
“alternative.” In the process, Warren is unquestionably activist in setting out the
necessary pre-interrogation procedures, going so far as to create, out of whole cloth, a
Fifth Amendment right to counsel as opposed to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
(and a right to the appointment of Fifth Amendment counsel if indigent).
The subsequent Dickerson litigation, several decades later, would turn precisely
on whether Congress’s response in 1968—18 U.S.C. § 3501—was more effective than
the Miranda warnings.114 This is, essentially, a systems analysis type of question: to
resolve it, we need to load both the Miranda warnings and the 18 U.S.C. § 3501
procedures into Quade’s model and see whether the latter exceed the level of protection
afforded by the former. Of this, Warren was clear: “unless other fully effective means are
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adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the
right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required.”115
Note that the systems analytic material, in the Miranda decision, does not address
the legal issue at hand—namely the extension of the Fifth Amendment right to police
custody—a legal question that is resolved through a far more extensive, capacious, and
wide-ranging discussion of policing and democracy in the modern era, and that ranges
from Lord Devlin’s writings and English procedure since 1912, to India, Ceylon and
Scotland, to democratic theory. But it is present at the remedies stage. In that sense, it
could possibly be thought of more in line with Operations Research than with Systems
Analysis—an important difference that is worth keeping in mind with regard to the
proper scope of cost-benefit analysis.
It is interesting to note that Justice Harlan’s dissent in Miranda also has a systems
analytic ring to it.116 (Recall that Harlan had led the Eighth Air Force Operations
Analysis Section during World War II). Harlan focuses on a detailed comparison of the
different alternatives along policy grounds: “Viewed as a choice based on pure policy,
these new rules prove to be a highly debatable, if not one-sided, appraisal of the
competing interests, imposed over widespread objection, at the very time when judicial
restraint is most called for by the circumstances.”117 Harlan’s Due Process jurisprudence
is, in fact, guided by a systemic approach: as he writes, the Due Process Clause cases
“show that there exists a workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a
judicial manner” and they reveal “the baseline from which the Court now departs and so
serve to measure the actual as opposed to the professed distance it travels.”118 Harlan
challenges the majority in Miranda not only on legal, but on policy grounds, in what
sounds very much like systems discourse.119
As Daniel Richman suggests, the Warren Court’s incorporation doctrine and
expanded habeas corpus review practically demanded a systems analytic approach: by
placing itself over an entirely decentralized criminal justice universe—one that extended
into the deepest reaches of local and municipal practices, such as local bailbondsmen and
sheriffs—the Court had to use systems functionality discourse as a necessary heuristic
device. One could argue that it was perhaps inevitable that the Court would think in
systems terms once it had to wrap its hands around such a localized criminal justice
world.
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More recent canonical Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law and procedure
area reveal perhaps even more systems analytic reasoning on the core constitutional
issues at stake. Justice Powell’s opinion for the Court in McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) is a
good illustration.120 Justice Powell adopts a systems perspective when he analyzes the
role of discretion (prosecutorial, judicial, jury, and other) in the functioning of the
criminal justice system—as a counterweight to the legal challenge involving racial
discrimination. The opinion is written in a way that includes the judiciary, the jury, the
attorneys, etc., as part of the system, and in this sense, represents an instance of the
internal style of systems analytic decision-making. For Justice Powell, the legal claim
itself is a challenge addressed to the very functioning of the criminal justice system:
McCleskey challenges decisions at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system.
“[O]ne of society’s most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens
and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through criminal
laws against murder.” Gregg v. Georgia (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring).
Implementation of these laws necessarily requires discretionary judgments.
Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand
exceptionally clear proof before we would infer that the discretion has been
abused.121
Notice how the system’s needs become necessities and how the functioning of the
criminal justice system naturally heightens the legal burden imposed on the petitioner
McCleskey. The result is that the system’s “needs” are privileged. In rejecting
McCleskey’s challenge, Powell emphasizes that “McCleskey’s argument that the
Constitution condemns the discretion allowed decisionmakers in the Georgia capital
sentencing system is antithetical to the fundamental role of discretion in our criminal
justice system.”122
The analysis is framed in terms of system requirements and system functionality,
and so, Powell concludes: “Where the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal
process is involved, we decline to assume that what is unexplained is invidious. In light
of the safeguards designed to minimize racial bias in the process, the fundamental value
of jury trial in our criminal justice system, and the benefits that discretion provides to
criminal defendants, we hold that the Baldus study does not demonstrate a
constitutionally significant risk of racial bias affecting the Georgia capital sentencing
process.”123 From this particular systems analytic perspective, the risk of harm associated
with racial prejudice does not undermine the value of discretion to the overall system:
“Apparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice
system,”124 Powell observes. Powell’s opinion in McCleskey is really an idealtype of a
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decision that takes a systems analytic approach to the criminal justice system. Ultimately,
the question ends up revolving centrally around the system’s need for discretion.
The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding the principle of finality in the habeas
corpus context is another good example. The argument for foreclosing consideration of
certain issues past a certain point in time (for instance, once the petitioner has entered
collateral review) rests predominantly on the argument that there are certain things the
criminal justice system needs in order to function properly—and one of those is finality.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Teague v. Lane, for instance, can serve as an
illustration.125 The question there was whether a habeas petitioner is entitled to the benefit
of a new legal rule (in that case, whether the Sixth Amendment fair cross section
requirement would apply to a petit jury) if the rule is announced after the petitioner has
exhausted his direct appeals and while the petitioner is in collateral review. Justice
O’Connor, for the Court, adopted Justice Harlan’s retroactivity standard, which barred
the retroactive effect of new rules to cases pending in collateral review (with two narrow
exceptions).
Justice O’Connor’s reasoning tracks perfectly the systems analytic approach.
Justice O’Connor begins as follows:
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction
became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to
the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is
deprived of much of its deterrent effect.126
Justice O’Connor then reviews the cost-effectiveness of the alternative policy and finds
that it is prohibitive:
The “costs imposed upon the State[s] by retroactive application of new rules of
constitutional law on habeas corpus ... generally far outweigh the benefits of this
application.” Stumes (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). In many ways the
application of new rules to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than
the enjoining of criminal prosecutions, cf. Younger v. Harris, for it continually
forces the States to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose
trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards. … We find
these criticisms to be persuasive, and we now adopt Justice Harlan’s view of
retroactivity for cases on collateral review.127
This systems analytic approach, interestingly, has also been used in recent
scholarship to defend the principle of finality in cases of purported actual innocence.
William Baude, for instance, argues that if “courts must allow every prisoner to
perpetually pursue claims of innocence, it might push an already overburdened judicial
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system to the brink.”128 Such a right to not be executed if innocent would render the
criminal justice system dysfunctional. Perfect accuracy is not the systems objective,
Baude emphasizes: “perfect accuracy is not the goal of the criminal justice system.”129
Notice how the neutral objectives of the system drive the analysis.130
Most capital habeas litigation reflects this. For instance, in Doyle Lee Hamm v.
Richard Allen, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (Eleventh
Circuit, No. 13-14376-P), the central issue is whether the Eleventh Circuit can review the
validity of a prior felony conviction from 1978 that was used as an aggravating
circumstance to enhance Hamm’s sentence to death in 1987. As a pretty straightforward
matter, the prior felony conviction is facially invalid: the plea hearing from 1978 is
unconstitutional, on its face, because the circuit judge in Tennessee in 1978 did not
inform Hamm of the constitutional rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty, in clear
violation of Boykin v. Alabama.131 This problem has slowed the case down to a crawl,
and Hamm has been on death row for 26 years in part because of this festering sore—and
yet, not a single judge to date has addressed the merits of the argument or read the short,
2,500-word transcript of the plea hearing on its merits, because of the federal system’s
interest in finality: the case is a perfect illustration of the situation where the reviewing
judges (at the state and federal, trial and appellate levels) have taken a systems analytic
approach focused on the purported integrity or functionality of the system itself in order
to avoid consideration of the claims on the merits. What the systems analytic approach
obviates is a full consideration of the other values regarding the criminal sanction that
circulate in society.132
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b. The External Approach: Deference to the Criminal Justice System
In another manifestation, the courts view themselves as outside the criminal
justice system and instead resolve cases by deferring to the expertise of core actors within
the system. A recent illustration would be Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders
(2011) regarding the constitutionality of strip searches incident to jail detention for minor
arrests. Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority, upholding a policy of prophylactic
strip searches, essentially defers to the system’s experts.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Florence opens on a particularly strong systems
analytic tone. The first two sentences of the opinion read: “Correctional officials have a
legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by
reason of what new detainees may carry on their bodies. Facility personnel, other
inmates, and the new detainee himself or herself may be in danger if these threats are
introduced into the jail population.”133 Kennedy’s opinion emphasizes the closed-nature
of the jail system,134 and in rejecting the argument for constitutional limits on strip
searches, Justice Kennedy writes that any such limits would vitiate the objectives of the
system: “The laborious administration of prisons would become less effective, and likely
less fair and evenhanded.”135 Justice Kennedy’s decision is guided by a systems analytic
approach:
“The difficulties of operating a detention center must not be underestimated by
the courts…. Maintaining safety and order at these institutions requires the
expertise of correctional officials, who must have substantial discretion to devise
reasonable solutions to the problems they face.”136
Justice Kennedy marshals and quantifies the risks to the jail system, and then
defers to the systems experts: “In addressing this type of constitutional claim courts must
defer to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains substantial
evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of
jail security.”137
Justice Kennedy’s decision in Maryland v. King (2013), upholding the use of
DNA evidence against a person charged with sexual assault where the DNA sample had
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been taken as a matter of routine booking on another arrest, provides another illustration.
Justice Kennedy opens his legal analysis with the following systems analytics:
the utility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system is already
undisputed. Since the first use of forensic DNA analysis to catch a rapist and
murderer in England in 1986, law enforcement, the defense bar, and the courts
have acknowledged DNA testing’s “unparalleled ability both to exonerate the
wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly
improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices.”138
Once this systems view is established, it then does a lot of work. Faced with the
Fourth Amendment issue in the case, Justice Kennedy finds that the governmental
interest served by the Maryland DNA Collection Act is a core function of the criminal
justice system—namely, “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and accurate
way to process and identify the persons and possessions they must take into custody.”139
It is because of the system’s needs that Kennedy then upholds the DNA sampling. As he
writes, the “context of arrest gives rise to significant state interests in identifying
respondent not only so that the proper name can be attached to his charges but also so
that the criminal justice system can make informed decisions concerning pretrial
custody.”140 It is also interesting to note that Justice Scalia’s outraged dissent in King
essentially dismantles the system functionality analysis of the DNA sampling for
identification. Justice Scalia takes apart the systems reasoning of the majority decision.
There are many other doctrinal areas where the courts defer to the outside experts.
This is especially the case, for instance, in the context of military criminal justice where
there has traditionally been greater deference to the needs of the military system and
military objectives.141
In all of these cases, it is precisely the systems analytic approach that affords this
style of judicial decision-making its neutrality and objectivity. Just as Schlesinger would
claim that systems analysis is objective and eliminates moral or normative considerations,
judicial reasoning that rests on this approach also claims objectivity and purports to avoid
subjective normative judgments. On this view, a particular practice—such as, for
instance, jury discretion or stop-and-frisk policies—is viewed as either efficient and
necessary to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system or not, but in either
case the determination is presented as an objective fact about the practice that does not
require normative or moral evaluation. The needs of the system do not lend themselves to
subjective assessments or evaluation: the systems analytic approach in adjudication is
about reality, a proponent might say, not about morality.
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c. A Foil
These are examples or, more accurately, idealtypes of two forms of contemporary
systems analytic reasoning—the internal and external. They can be found alongside other
styles of judicial decision-making. In any particular judicial opinion that relies on
systems analytics, they are not necessarily the only reason or style of reasoning used;
they may accompany other forms of argumentation; and they are not always decisive.
In closing, to sharpen the idealtype, it may be useful to offer a foil, an example of
its opposite. Here we could look to Judge Shira Scheindlin’s opinion in the New York
City stop-and-frisk litigation for a contrasting idealtype. At the very beginning of her
opinion in Floyd v. City of New York, Judge Scheindlin writes:
I emphasize at the outset, as I have throughout the litigation, that this case is not
about the effectiveness of stop and frisk in deterring or combating crime. This
Court’s mandate is solely to judge the constitutionality of police behavior, not its
effectiveness as a law enforcement tool. Many police practices may be useful for
fighting crime—preventive detention or coerced confessions, for example—but
because they are unconstitutional they cannot be used, no matter how effective.
“The enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices
off the table.”142
From the outset, Judge Scheindlin sets aside any consideration of the
effectiveness or necessity of stop-and-frisk to the criminal justice system. This is not to
argue that Judge Scheindlin’s ultimate resolution of the constitutional questions in Floyd
is automatically correct just because she avoids systems analytic reasoning. We would
need a much longer discussion on the merits to decide that question. The only point here
is that systems analytics are effectively off the table and the notion of a “criminal justice
system” has been bracketed. I will come back to this point for further elaboration because
Judge Scheindlin’s opinion helps identify four very different approaches to decisionmaking.
C. THE PROBLEM WITH THESE TWO STYLES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
The earlier critical perspective on systems analysis can inform our appreciation of
these two styles of judicial decision-making in the field of criminal law and criminal
procedure—along the same dimensions.
In essence, the judicial adoption of a systems analytic approach distorts the legal
analysis by converting a particular practice into an objective necessity. It cloaks the
judicial decision-making in an aura of neutrality and gives the impression that the legal
determination is scientific and objective, rather than moral or normative. In the process,
the judicial decision imposes, by means of the practices or policy at issue, a particular
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balance of values and ideals. By achieving this under the guise of a systems analytic
approach, the decision-makers mask the value choices that they are imposing.
To take a concrete case, in McCleskey, discussed earlier, Justice Powell treats
discretion as a necessary element for the proper functioning of the criminal justice
system. Although the Court has not engaged sensu stricto in systems analysis—the Court
has not identified or compared all the promising alternatives—it is ranking the
discretionary practices in question as satisfying the system requirements, as satisfying the
“criterion” of the model. In doing so, it is treating “the criminal justice system” as (1)
having certain objective needs; (2) needs that can be determined neutrally, without
recourse to moral or normative argumentation; (3) by means of an analysis that is not
political in nature, but modeled on science. In McCleskey, the Court never admits that it
is imposing particular social values or engaging in an analysis that involves political
choices. In fact, the Court specifically severs the political dimension of the question by
suggesting that McCleskey should address his argument to the political branches, not
judicial decision-makers: “McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative
bodies,” Justice Powell writes.
The clear implication is that the systems analytic justification has avoided
political or moral considerations.143 In Schlesinger’s words, it has dealt with reality, not
with morality—though we know that is not true. In the same way that Robert Cover
taught us to unveil the way in which the formality of law can serve as a crutch to justify
judicial decisions that one would never willingly choose,144 the discourse of “system’s
needs” must be exposed as pure pretense. The “system” itself is a construct, its scope and
borders entirely fabricated, and its “requirements” pure discretion. The reasoning serves
merely to mask the political choices that are being made—the value choices that we
should be making deliberately and deliberatively.
Notice, importantly, that the systems analysis in McCleskey does not revolve
predominantly around crime reduction. Justice Powell has not adopted Packer’s crime
control model. The practices in question are not being measured along a criminological
dimension. Rather, the question is whether the practices are necessary to the smooth
functioning of the system. The objective is the functionality of the system—which
essentially represents, for the Court, an objective or neutral stance. Having a functioning
“criminal justice system” is, for the Court, an obvious and natural priority that does not
seem to trigger an evaluation of social values or ideals. But what the technical
examination of systems analysis reveals is that it is: the systems framework, the selection
of a model, the evaluation along a criterion can shift the balance of values in society. And
it does so precisely because all the different possible practices are not fungible substitutes
that simply promote the system’s objectives or functionality. Practices and policies need
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to be evaluated in terms of how they are going to distribute and redistribute, or distort the
balance of values that we share as a society. Those effects should not occur blindly or by
the inadvertent effect of systems analysis.
In other words, judicial decisions that rest on systems analytic justification tend to
take for granted the smooth functioning of the criminal justice system as an overarching
objective, thereby insulating the legal analysis from deeper critical inquiry. The approach
starts, at the outset, by assuming a consensus surrounding the objective of the system—
for instance, promoting the functionality of the criminal justice system, or improving
crime control, etc. The consequence is that there is little consideration of the larger
question how the objectives of the “criminal justice system” relate to other social
processes and values. Systems analytic approaches hinder a full debate over the larger
consequences to society. The fact is, though, that taking for granted the objective of a
smooth functioning system of jails, of capital punishment, or of mass incarceration in this
country today is itself a position that requires justification.
In addition, the other critiques apply as well. First, it is unlikely that judicial
decision-makers have the necessary training to fully or properly engage the merits of the
systems analysis, and so may well engage in satisficing. This would be true, of course,
for most people other than trained economists—this is not meant to impugn lawyers or
judges. It’s simply a fact that legal education today still does not require or generally
include quantitative training.
Second, judicial decision-making that rests on systems analytic approaches tends
to select on the more quantifiable objectives and variables, such as crime control,
management efficiency, or system functionality, at the expense of higher-order and softer
social values, thus privileging the more measurable and instrumental factors.145 Here too,
in the context of the “criminal justice system,” those factors that can be measured more
easily—crime related variables, arrest rates or convictions—will get priority over more
qualitative or soft variables, such as racial equality. This is partially why, for instance,
Packer’s due process model is a watered down version of systems analysis or may not
even qualify. It is because those values of legality and fair notice are particularly difficult
to quantify, producing a hybrid model that has very little “scientific” traction. It’s too soft
to model. This is particularly problematic when we notice, with Malcolm Gladwell, that
heterogenous rankings that aspire to be comprehensive are particularly amenable to
distortion.146

145

See, e.g., Carol Steiker, “Lessons From Two Failures: Sentencing For Cocaine And Child Pornography
Under The Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States,” 76(1) Law & Contemporary Problems 2752 (2013) (discussing the quantification bias and errors in federal sentencing); Daniel Richman, “Federal
White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work In Progress,” 76(1) Law & Contemporary Problems
53-73 (2013) (discussing the quantification of loss amount in white collar sentencing).
146
Malcolm Gladwell, “The Order of Things: What college rankings really tell us,” The New Yorker,
February 14, 2011.

50

The Florence decision is a good illustration. Justice Kennedy is able to and does
quantify some of the security risks: “This record has concrete examples,” he writes.
“Officers at the Atlantic County Correctional Facility, for example, discovered that a man
arrested for driving under the influence had ‘2 dime bags of weed, 1 pack of rolling
papers, 20 matches, and 5 sleeping pills’ taped under his scrotum.”147 The Justices debate
a recent study of 75,000 new inmates over a five year period that found 16 instances
where a full body search revealed contraband.148 By contrast, the liberty interests are far
less tangible, and as a result, do not weigh equally in the systems analysis. Strip searches
often include delousing showers, having to lift your genitals, and being forced to squatand-cough while someone is peering up your rectum or vagina: those liberty interests are
less easily quantified than the raw number of successful searches, even when they are as
low as 16/75,000. Florence is precisely a case where the more measurable, quantifiable,
and instrumental factors associated with the harder social systems—here, the jail
system—serve to tilt the analysis in a particular direction. The hard edge of systems
analysis, as noted earlier, favors hard systems.
Returning to Judge Schindlin’s opinion for a moment, it may be useful to map out
the different possible ways of resolving the legal question:
(1) Schindlin’s approach: disregard empirical evidence of efficacy of policy;
(2) Other extreme: assume that the policy is perfectly effective;
(3) Middle ground: allow judgment about effectiveness to weigh in analysis of
constitutional values; take testimony from experts (Fagan, etc.) and then make
a factual determination about the cost-benefit that is used in weighing the
burden on constitutional rights; or
(4) The criminal justice system trump card: rely on the system “needs” to decide
the constitutional issue, i.e. either the system needs to have these stops-andfrisks that should limit constitutional rights, or not.
In essence, it is the fourth way of resolving a legal dispute that is most
problematic. One can easily remain agnostic as to the first three approaches, even though
the second approach would seem the most appropriate and respectful of the different
responsibilities and expertise of the different actors. In this regard, it may also be
appropriate to draw a distinction between evaluating the effectiveness of a policy in the
context of the legal decision and in the context of the remedies only (as in Miranda,
possibly). In any event, though, the greatest problem with systems thought is when it
generates outcomes based on an implicit teleology of the system—which is captured by
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the fourth approach above. It is when it serves as a trump that silences a proper weighing
of values that it is most problematic.149
D. THE PROBLEM IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE MORE BROADLY
These problems do not only plague judicial decision-making. They also pose the
same problems to criminal justice studies and other systems analytic approaches more
broadly. The problems can be illustrated well in the original Liechenstein study from
1971 discussed earlier.150
Based on the close analysis of the different alternatives, the Liechenstein report
found that the most efficient technique was police manning. Policing trumped education
or recreation in terms of efficiency.151 The systems analysis had value effects. And the
City ultimately implemented very similar policy solutions, focused precisely on increased
policing and manpower. After a 63-year-old woman in a Lower East Side project was
killed, Simeon Golar, chairman of the New York City Housing Authority, instituted a
“‘100-man mobile task force’ consisting of 40 housing policemen and the hiring of 60
new policemen.”152 There followed a $500,000 initiative to hire armed and unarmed
guards for the city’s housing projects, as well as a $1 million allocation for security and
surveillance equipment.153 The increased police manning was also accompanied by
stricter judicial sentencing. There was a perceived sense in the media and among
politicians that lax judicial practices had contributed to the crime epidemic.154 These
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combined policy interventions would fuel increased incarceration in New York State that
would contribute, starting in 1973, to what has come to be known today as mass
incarceration.155
The NYC RAND Institute’s systems analytic approach favored the police and
punishment-oriented solutions that were inherently more tangible, measureable, and
quantifiable—these were the type of policy levers associated with metrics that were
easier to quantify, to collect, to code, and to regress. This is, after all, natural; it is far
easier to quantitatively study criminal justice metrics (such as arrests, searches,
convictions, or police force) than it is to study the long-term consequences of education,
poverty-relief, or neighborhood trust. But it produces a fallacy. By taking for granted the
construction of the social problem, by choosing a narrow, quantifiable objective, by
focusing on more measurable outcomes, and by costing-out “fungible” policies, the
systems analytic approach shapes our value system without ever having explicitly
engaged the debate.
E. A CODA ON MASS INCARCERATION
As already noted, the problem in the area of criminal justice is much larger than
the narrow issue of judicial decision-making based on a systems analytic approach. The
problem goes far deeper, and entails far more troubling social outcomes.
Punishment practices more generally, today, are often operationalized through a
systems analytic approach: we tend to approach these matters from the perspective of a
“criminal justice system,” with its objectives and needs (e.g. crime reduction, population
management, etc.), and then pursue policies that most efficiently advance those
objectives. In the process, we ignore many other important dimensions.
Mass incarceration—or more appropriately, the hyper-incarceration of inner-city,
minority young men—is a tragic example of this. To be sure, it is the product of a
complex interaction of micro- and macro-level factors including national and local
politics, sentencing reforms, racial discrimination, perceptions of crime, and special
interest lobbying, over the course of forty years.156 But systems analysis facilitated the
phenomenon, especially at the level of ideas and justification.
The theory of “selective incapacitation”—which would morph into mass
incarceration—was originally theorized by the RAND Corporation and developed
precisely as a systems “fix” to the excessive cost of the prison system. A few years after
the New York City RAND Institute closed its doors, in the early 1980s, RAND
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established the Habitual Offender Project. That project would focus on the strategy of
“selective incapacitation” as a new and promising, cost-effective measure to combat
crime.
The idea of selective incapacitation was premised on the empirical observation
that a limited number of offenders tend to commit a disproportionally large percentage of
offences. If true, and if those individuals could be identified, then in theory it would be
efficient to focus on those high-rate offenders and imprison them for longer terms, rather
than incarcerate low-rate offenders. The RAND project originated in response to studies
of California prisons that revealed, surprisingly, no real differences in prison sentences as
between low and high rate offenders. The idea behind the RAND project was to
efficiently reshuffle inmate sentencing: By locking up high-rate offenders for longer
periods, a state could both reduce its crime rate and simultaneously decrease its prison
population. The policy promised budgetary savings and reduced crime.
Peter Greenwood, with Allan Abrahamse, issued a RAND report in 1982 that set
forth the most fully articulated plan for implementing the strategy of selective
incapacitation.157 Titled “Selective Incapacitation,” the report began as follows: “The
American system of criminal justice is now at a crossroad. Deprived of rehabilitation as
an organizing theme, pressed by a fearful and dissatisfied public to provide greater
protection from violent crimes, saddled with dangerously overcrowded and decrepit
prisons, and facing the prospect of severely limited resources to carry out its functions,
the justice system is now searching for new ways to control crime.”158 The report studied
the feasibility of one such new way: predicting future dangerousness in order to impose
lengthier sentences on habitual offenders. The study then tried to estimate the costeffectiveness of selecting on dangerousness.
The researchers based their prediction research on self-report surveys from 2,100
male prison and jail inmates from California, Michigan and Texas in 1977.159 They
focused on robbery and burglary offenses, excluding more serious crimes such as murder
or rape (given that low-base-rate crimes are so much more difficult to predict) and
developed a seven factor test to identify high-rate offenders (focusing primarily on prior
criminal record, history of drug abuse, and employment history). They assigned each
offender a score from zero through seven: a positive response on any one of these seven
factors resulted in one point on the offender’s score. The resulting score was used to
distinguish between low, medium or high rate offenders. When the researchers tested
their predictions, they found that their test identified low- and medium-rate offenders
with greater ability than high-rate offenders: 91 to 92 percent of those scoring 0 or 1—
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the lowest possible scores—turned out to be low- or medium-rate offenders; by contrast,
only 50 percent of those scoring 5, 6 or 7 turned out to be high-rate burglars or robbers.160
Despite the poor results, Greenwood concluded the study on an up-beat note:
“Increasing the accuracy with which we can identify high-rate offenders or increasing the
selectivity of sentencing policies can lead to a decrease in crime, a decrease in the prison
population, or both. Selective incapacitation is a way of increasing the amount of crime
prevented by a given level of incarceration.”161 Even though Greenwood found that
predicting future dangerousness was inexact—and five years later would revise the report
and issue it with a slightly different title: “Selective incapacitation revisited: why the
high-rate offenders are hard to predict”162—Greenwood nevertheless painted an
optimistic picture from what were not very cost-efficient conclusions:
Among California robbers, we found that a selective incapacitation strategy that
reduced terms for low- and medium-rate robbers while increasing terms for highrate robbers could achieve a 15 percent reduction in the robbery rate with only 95
percent of the current incarcerated population level for robbery. An unselective
attempt to increase incapacitation effects by increasing terms for all robbers
equally requires a 25 percent increase in population to bring about the same 15
percent reduction in crime. Among burglars, the best selective policy required a 7
percent increase in prison population to bring about a 15 percent reduction in
crime.
In Texas, we found that additional incapacitation effects would be much
more expensive. For robbers it would require a 30 percent increase in
incarceration level to achieve a 10 percent reduction in crime. For burglars, a 15
percent increase in incarceration would be required to achieve a 10 percent
reduction in crime. This higher cost is due to the low offense rate among Texas
inmates.163
A close reading of these conclusions reveals that the crime reduction benefits
required—in three out of four cases—increased prison populations. In effect, the idea of
selective incapacitation had already morphed into the theory of mass incapacitation.
Nevertheless, the Greenwood report had high impact and contributed importantly to the
rise and theoretical prominence of incapacitation theory, which undergirded a massive
increase in prison populations in the United States.164 The report was inducted into the
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operations research cannon of criminal justice—as least, according to Blumstein. In the
group of OR missionaries, Peter Greenwood featured prominently.165
Greenwood’s study, though, resembled more systems analysis than operations
research—which was precisely the problem. It focused on a narrow objective and then
evaluated one particular policy alternative that clearly had a distinct political valence,
without addressing the politics. It is precisely these kinds of systems analysis approaches
that are dangerous, because, in narrowing in on a consensus objective, they set aside an
open and frank debate about our values and ideals. The analysis miserably failed to
consider all of the negative consequences that the practice entailed—and this blindness
has continued to plague the topic of mass incarceration. To take but one: the toll on
citizenship. There is practically no consideration, today, for what mass incarceration does
to the civic engagement of the more than 2.2 million persons held behind bars or to the
more than 7 million persons under correctional supervision. Amy Lerman and Vesla
Weaver have begun to document some of the more measurable effects of incarceration on
public citizenship. They have shown how contact with the correctional system reduces
participation in democratic politics and carries with it a “substantial civic penalty”: it
produces a large, negative effect on “turning out to vote, involvement in civic groups, and
trusting the government,” taking into account the possibility of selection bias.166 But even
here, the studies only consider the more tangible effects, and one can only wonder about
the much broader impact of such a massive prison system on the democratic citizenship
of large segments of our communities.
This is not to suggest that systems analysis caused mass incarceration—nor to
suggest that there are no evidence-based systems analytic strategies that could help
reduce mass incarceration today. The point, instead, is that systems analytic approaches
do not take a sufficiently holistic approach to society and tend—I emphasize, tend—to
focus the analyst too narrowly on systems’ objectives. So, for instance, today, in the
context of decarceration, too many of the outcome-based systems analytic programs
focus on the release of inmates with low propensities for “dangerousness,” without
examining how the prediction of future dangerousness is coded for race and how these
solutions skew even further the racial imbalance in corrections. Similarly, the evidencebased systems analytic strategies focus on the reduction of recidivism, when in fact, it is
extremely hard to realistically affect recidivism. Instead of focusing so intensively on
reducing recidivism—the system’s primary focus—it may well be better, rather, to focus
on whether these programs reduce the very high likelihood that a reentering convict
overdoses or dies. The statistics here are frightening. But those, of course, are not viewed
as system needs, and so they do not rank high on the outcome metrics. Could we get it
right one day and do systems analysis better? Anything is possible, of course, but the
honest answer is: only if we can manage higher-level welfare analysis and do not remain
stuck within any particular system, especially the “criminal justice system.”
165

Blumstein, 2007, p. 22; for a review of OR contributions to the criminal justice system, see Maltz 1994.
Vesla Weaver and Amy Lerman, “Political Consequences of the Carceral State,” American Political
Science Review, Vol. 104(4): 817-833 (November 2010), p. 817 and 827.
166

56

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY
The systems analytic approach also significantly influenced the broader field of
public policy and, in some circles today, still dominates the logic of public policy
analysis. What was once technical systems analysis in the 1960s has become, for many
today, the canonical approach to public policy. This raises the question, then, whether the
systems fallacy is also at play in the broader domain of public policy. This question,
naturally, would deserve a full-length article by itself; but in this Part and in the space
that remains, I will begin to address this crucial extension of the systems fallacy.
A. THE INFLUENCE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS ON THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY
1960s systems analysis heavily influenced the contemporary study of public
policy. This is evident if one listens carefully to the self-description of the field by
current-day public policy advocates. Here is Edward Rubin, for instance, describing the
field: “The components of an optimal public policymaking process are well known and
generally agreed upon”167: they include, first, selecting a problem, second, finding the
range of alternative policies, third, assessing each one, and fourth, ranking them—or, in
Rubin’s own words:
First, the decision maker should define the problem to be solved. The next step is
to generate a range of possible alternatives that might potentially resolve the
problem. Each alternative is then assessed for its potential effectiveness on the
basis of the available information. Then the decision maker chooses the most
promising alternative; the more information and analysis that can be brought to
bear on the decision, the more likely it will be that the most effective alternative
will be selected. Once the choice is made, it must be implemented…168
This is, as you will immediately notice, a more informal but exact articulation of
the RAND model. And it is generally considered the “optimal” public policymaking
process, according to leading public policy figures, including Eugene Bardach, Thomas
Birkland, John Friedman, Lewis Zekhauser, and Deborah Stone.169 As Rubin emphasizes,
it is “the decision making sequence that is widely recognized in our society as the most
promising way to make public policy.”170
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Stone and Zekhauser set forth the sequence as follows in their canonical text on
public policy analysis, A Primer for Policy Analysis:171
1. Establishing the Context. What is the underlying problem that must be dealt
with? What specific objectives are to be pursued in confronting this problem?
2. Laying Out the Alternatives. What are the alternative courses of action? What
are the possibilities for gathering further information?
3. Predicting the Consequences. What are the consequences of each of the
alternative actions? What techniques are relevant for predicting these
consequences? If outcomes are uncertain, what is the estimated likelihood of
each?
4. Valuing the Outcomes. By what criteria should we measure success in
pursuing each objective? Recognizing that inevitably some alternatives will be
superior with respect to certain objectives and inferior with respect to others,
how should different combinations of valued objectives be compared with one
another?
5. Making a Choice. Drawing all aspects of the analysis together, what is the
preferred course of action?172
Underlying this approach and its generalization, there is an idea that in practically
all domains there is a policy space within which it is possible to use this policy method to
achieve better results, to be more effective, to get it right—or, in Rubin’s words, to “do a
better job in that inevitable social engineering in which we engage in all the time.”173
What the policy approach does is to try to magnify the policy space in order to
incrementally improve decision-making—in the very same way in which systems
analysis tried to extend its reach from the narrow confines of military operations research
to the entire administrative state. As Rubin writes: “the more information and analysis
that can be brought to bear on the decision, the more likely it will be that the most
effective alternative will be selected.”174
a. The Problem with Expansive Public Policy
Clearly, systems analytic approaches have shaped the contemporary study of
public policy and have the greatest influence on what I would call “expansive” or
“imperialist” public policy—namely, public policy approaches that seek to maximize the
policy space by adopting the most classical approach that begins by selecting a large set
of fungible promising alternatives. It is, however, in this context that the very same
171

Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy Analysis (New York: Norton & Co., 1978).
Stockey and Zeckhauser, 1978, pp. 5-6.
173
Rubin comments at Columbia Law School Legal Theory Workshop, September 30, 2013.
174
Rubin, p. 38.
172

58

problem—the systems fallacy—will again surface and present difficulties. Here too, the
systems analytic approach inverts the relationship between the policy method and
political values: it imposes political values under the guise of mere method. This is
precisely the problem demonstrated in Part II.B above. The critique applies with full
force and in its most pristine way to these types of “expansive” public policy approaches
that perfectly mirror systems analysis.
B. RECONSTRUCTED COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
As Clifford Geertz intimated in his seminal essay, “Thick Description: Toward an
Interpretive Theory of Culture” (1973), most ideas begin as large systems and are then
incrementally reduced to size.175 Today, a number of legal scholars have proposed, in
various ways, more limited versions of cost-benefit to address the many criticisms,
especially the concerns that have been leveled against traditional forms of cost-benefit
analysis. Over the past decades, there have been several intelligent proposals to refound
and reconstruct cost-benefit analysis along more pragmatic and flexible, and less
imperialistic lines: to save the valuable part of cost-benefit as a tool to assess programs
and policies, while eliminating the unnecessary accoutrements, by crafting a humbler,
second-best method to guide decision-making.
Cass Sunstein has taken, for many years now, a more limited, chastened, or what
might be called “pragmatic” approach to cost-benefit analysis, both in theory and in
practice.176 Sunstein’s more pragmatic approach is reflected, by no mere coincidence, in
the Obama administration’s Executive Order 13563, which suggests, for example, that
agencies “may consider (and discuss qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible
to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts.” Both in
his official functions and in his writings, Cass Sunstein has helped soften the edges of
traditional cost-benefit analysis, emphasizing a greater recognition of the limits of
quantification, of the difficulties of monetary measures and of translating everything into
dollar equivalents—all the while, though, being a strong proponent of cost-benefit
analysis, which is reflected for instance in the recent NSA report that he co-authored.
In a somewhat similar vein, Matthew Adler and Eric Posner, in their book New
Foundations of Cost–Benefit Analysis, have proposed a more limited, pragmatic approach
to cost-benefit.177 They suggest that we should think of the method not as an ideal, firstorder technique that provides unassailable answers, but rather as a second-best device for
making decisions, one that is most suited to our current epistemological and political
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conditions. The method, they argue, should be thought of as just that: a decision-making
method. And as such, they argue, it is nothing more than a “rough and ready proxy” for
the kind of welfare analysis that we would ideally want to engage in, if we lived in a
perfect world, but that is merely sufficient in the real world to achieve the tasks at
hand.178 It should be viewed as a kind of “weak welfarism” in which “overall well-being
is one of a possible plurality of fundamental moral considerations.”179 In presenting the
method in this way, Adler and Posner recognize that there are difficulties with
quantification and cost-benefit, but argue that any problems with the method do not cause
sufficiently significant distortions to warrant concern. CBA, they argue “should be seen
as a comparative ‘best fit,’ not a perfect procedure.”180
These more pragmatic approaches have also introduced certain deontological
limits to quantification. A good illustration of this is in the recent report, discussed
earlier, by the commission appointed by President Obama to review the government’s
policies of domestic and international surveillance, following the Edward Snowden
disclosures regarding the NSA, and to recommend policy reforms. Cass Sunstein, who
was one of the five members of the commission, left a strong imprint on the report, one
that can be felt especially with regard to the recommendation that the executive branch
engage in cost-benefit analysis. One of the core principles that the commission
recommended in its report specifically states that “The government should base its
decisions on a careful analysis of consequences, including both benefits and costs (to the
extent feasible).”181 Under this header, the report notes:
In many areas of public policy, officials are increasingly insistent on the need for
careful analysis of the consequences of their decisions, and on the importance of
relying not on intuitions and anecdotes, but on evidence and data. Before they are
undertaken, surveillance decisions should depend (to the extent feasible) on a
careful assessment of the anticipated consequences, including the full range of
relevant risks. Such decisions should also be subject to continuing scrutiny,
including retrospective analysis, to ensure that any errors are corrected.”182
The report also recommends, as Recommendation 46 of its report: “We
recommend the use of cost-benefit analysis and risk-management approaches, both
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prospective and retrospective, to orient judgments about personnel security and network
security measures.”183
But what is particularly interesting to note here is that the recommendation
regarding the use of cost-benefit analysis is strictly limited by the strict adherence to
certain deontological principles. So, for instance, the report states up front that, regardless
of the cost-effectiveness of certain policies,
some safeguards are not subject to balancing at all. In a free society, public
officials should never engage in surveillance in order to punish their political
enemies; to restrict freedom of speech or religion; to suppress legitimate criticism
and dissent; to help their preferred companies or industries; to provide domestic
companies with an unfair competitive advantage; or to benefit or burden members
of groups defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, race, and gender.184
Notice that the cost-benefit method proposed, then, expressly takes some factors
off the table. It draws limits, deontological limits, on the scope of the method itself—
limits that would be entirely antithetical to a full-blown, robust welfare calculus.
In addition, central to many of these reconstructive projects is the idea of
reiterative or retrospective evaluations as a way to properly update information over time.
This is a key component of the sophisticated pragmatic approaches to cost-benefit—
which is evident again in the Obama commission report, in passages which emphasize
that an essential component of the Obama administration executive order on cost-benefit
is “retrospective analysis” of policy implementations: all analyses, the report states,
“should also be subject to continuing scrutiny, including retrospective analysis, to ensure
that any errors are corrected.”185
These three components—a more limited decision-making technique, with certain
deontological limits, that is updated through retrospective analysis—constitute a new,
more chastened version of cost-benefit analysis. Some scholars, such as Amy Sinden,
refer to this reconstructed version as “cost-benefit lite.”186
a.

The Return of the Systems Fallacy

Some critics of the new reconstructed cost-benefit approaches argue that the
earlier criticisms of traditional cost-benefit analysis still apply to the reconstructive
projects and should thus make us skeptical of them.187 As some of the leading critics—
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Douglas Kysar, Amy Sinden, and David Driesen—remark, regarding potential criticisms
of the new approaches:
Does this sound familiar? These are exactly the complaints about CBA as a
decision procedure that many of us have been voicing for years. The problem is
that, while their defense of overall welfare as a morally relevant criterion and their
description of CBA as an imperfect proxy for overall welfare are thoroughly,
painstakingly, and convincingly argued, Adler and Posner have failed to
demonstrate that CBA as a decision procedure does not suffer from all the same
shortcomings they associate with direct implementation: inaccuracy, vulnerability
to manipulation, and inordinate expense.188
Although I sympathize with these arguments, I would take a different position. I
would argue, instead, from an internal perspective, that the notion of a mere second-best
decision making tool is misleading: if one actually believes that the kind of quantitative
analysis that is called for by the reconstructive project is actually doable, if one believes
that those types of measurements and metrics are sufficiently reliable to decide,
effectively, life and death questions, then one has to engage in the higher-level welfare
analysis. One has to move up to the more encompassing level of analysis that takes
general welfare into account. Anything short of that will distort outcomes.
This is precisely the point I demonstrated in Part II.B.b above. As I show there,
the partial use of cost-effectiveness likely will distort overall welfare. An illustration may
be helpful: suppose that mass incarceration was cost-effective in the sense that it reduced
violent crime at a reasonable cost by an amount, say, of 15% over forty years. Suppose in
fact that it was the most effective measure of all the measures studied and compared to
affect the crime rate. Suppose, however, that the investment itself—more than $50 billion
per year over the course of the past forty years—if it had been invested instead in cancer
research, would have resulted in finding a cure for cancer. The result of partial or limited
cost-benefit analysis—of cost-benefit analyses limited to the criminal justice system—is
that we would be left, today, with our current, remarkably low levels of violent crime,
which would have occurred naturally (recall, on these assumptions they would have
fallen 85% on their own because of demographic and other national level factors, as in
Canada) but there would be no cure for cancer. That is clearly a net loss to society. But it
is the direct consequence of having conducted a limited cost-benefit analysis, rather than
an overall welfare calculus. If we turn to quantification, it has to be at the very highest
level—it has to be about general social welfare.
Adler and Posner’s reconstructive project, I would argue, makes precisely the
wrong move: They argue that we should think of cost-benefit as smaller than general
welfare maximizing, but as a good enough proxy for government business. This notion of
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“second-best” is a red-herring: If you believe that you can do the metrics, then you need
to be ambitious and do welfare analysis, otherwise you get distorted results.
C. THE PROPER PLACE OF QUANTIFICATION
As I emphasized in the Introduction, though, this surely does not mean that we
should be unsystematic or, in any way, opposed to systematicity and rigor in our
evaluation of public policies. The systems fallacy is a problem with the teleology of
systems thought. It is not an attack on systematicity or rigor. To the contrary,
understanding the systems fallacy requires rigor, and the analysis in this article helps to
define more clearly the proper approach and the place of quantification.
Identifying the systems fallacy focuses our attention on the choice of scope issues
that are necessarily implicated by the analysis of laws, regulations, or public policies. It
militates strongly in favor of avoiding as much as possible or limiting reliance on
methods that construct metaphorical systems and bounded sets of fungible public
policies, given that so much normative work is hidden by the choice of scope itself. It
militates in favor of being constantly vigilant about the social and political values that are
included in the analysis and those that are hidden, ignored, or discounted. In effect, it
pushes us toward a more reflexive approach to analysis: an approach that constantly asks
us to reexamine how we have set up and constructed the boundaries of the analysis, and
how that construction may hide particular tilts in the analysis, privilege particular values,
or affect the outcome of the analysis. This is an approach that constantly reassesses
whether any particular values are being discounted or privileged, whether any interests
are being ignored, whether any factors are being hidden.
Law and policy analysts turned to systems analytic methods in large part because
total welfare analysis was viewed as too unwieldy for policy and judicial decision
makers. But the turn to systems analysis produced predictable distortions centered on the
scope of the figurative system. In order to improve the decision-making process, then, the
way forward must circumvent, as much as possible, these choice of scope issues. It need
not, though, eliminate all metrics or uses of benchmarks to assess individual policies or
regulations. Evaluating the effectiveness of programs, of course, remains important. If
programs are not contributing to a stated objective or are counter-effective, that is
important information to have. For example, if broken-windows policing, stop-and-frisk
policies, or gun-oriented policing are not reducing serious crime, it is important to know
in order to decide whether to engage in those enforcement practices.189 It is important to
remain cognizant of efficacy questions, without letting those concerns trump the
balancing of values.
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There are, for example, promising uses of benchmarking that have been
advocated by scholars such as Christopher Ansell as part of a pragmatic, evolutionary
learning method to public policy. Drawing on the pragmatic insights of John Dewey, and
inspired by the democratic experimentalism of scholars such as Charles Sabel, William
Simon, and Michael Dorf, Ansell develops in his book, on Pragmatist Democracy:
Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy (Oxford 2011), an approach to public policy
that includes some use of metric, carefully defined, and retrospective analysis to evaluate
participatory projects. These approaches stay clear of the systems fallacy by focusing the
measured analysis on a specific policy within a single value dimension.
If metrics are going to be made part of the analysis, then, their inclusion should be
limited to an individualized analysis along a single value dimension. Metrics should
always focus on a single program, not on a system or a set of promising alternatives. And
their use must acknowledge the importance of staying within a single dimension of social
value. If any research is done on a comparative basis, it should be done purely for
research and not for implementation. Moreover, the alternatives policies that may be
compared have to be in the same register: whether, for instance, hot-spots policing works
better than broken-window policing—that would be a fine question to research.190
Whether to do 911-style policing or beat policing—that, too, is okay. But whether to
invest in the COPS program or in Head Start—that has to be off the table, because it is
going to skew our balance of values.
To summarize, any use of quantification should be focused on a single program,
policy or regulation, and not a figurative system or set of promising alternatives;
concentrated along a single value domain; always open to retrospective analysis and
criticism, recognizing the inevitable problems of scope that often creep back into the
analysis; and always attentive to the choice of scope issues and to whether values are
being hidden or ignored. The moment cost-benefit extends beyond a single dimension of
value and tackles a set of policies rather than just one, the analysis dangerously inverts
the relationship between policy and politics. It is also important to delegate any
quantitative work to trained methodologists in a field such as applied economics, rather
than to lawyers or judges if they do not have quantitative training. Most importantly,
though, it must be accompanied by constant reflexive analysis about choice of scope
questions and the possibility that particular values are being ignored in the analysis.
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CONCLUSION
Extending the method of Operations Research beyond weapons systems and into
broader public policy and judicial decision-making contexts has been treacherous and
“radical,”191 to borrow Edward Quade’s term. Radical, precisely for the reasons that
Quade and his RAND colleagues suggested: the approach takes no position on the
relative worth of very different kinds of practices that promote very different kinds of
social values. Quade’s pregnant remark that “education, antipoverty measures, police
protection, and slum clearance may all be alternatives in combating juvenile
delinquency”192 reveals the nub of the problem. The simplicity of the statement exposes
the central fault: the systems analytic approach ingeniously displaces larger debate over
the values that we hold as a society.
These methods are an approach that seduces by offering the hope of avoiding the
quagmire of partisanship or, in Schlesinger’s words, “morality,” and by focusing our
attention on narrow objectives that no one could possibly object to—reducing crime or
juvenile delinquency, for instance. They cunningly propose a disarmingly common sense,
neutral, and objective approach. Rather than get caught up in endless debates, we need
simply agree on more basic, measurable objectives (with an appreciation of resource
constraint), evaluate the different alternative ways of achieving those narrow objectives,
and then choose the most efficient alternative. But the systems analytic methods mask
rather than avoid value judgments. They do so by privileging and rendering natural
certain systems interests, while ignoring the consideration of other social values. They are
at their worst when they stop conversation: when they serve to stop the legal discussion
short and prevent countervailing values from ever getting named or weighed in the
analysis.
What the genealogy of contemporary reconstructed cost-benefit methods reveals,
most poignantly, is that the systems fallacy of earlier systems thought often creeps back
into these new types of analyses, even when they are reconstructed. The systems fallacy
helps identify the Achilles heel of these ventures. In most cases, systems thought and its
current rehabilitated forms are either too large or too small: too large in the sense that
they are often not properly confined by decision-makers to single policy assessments and
as a result distort the outcomes by imposing values and crowding out full debate and
value assessment; or too small, in the sense that any partial equilibrium analysis will
distort a proper, full-blown welfare analysis. Their pretense to comprehensiveness,
neutrality, and objectivity masks the inescapable value-laden prior choice of which
policies to pursue, which object to evaluate, which program to study. These problems are
clearest in the context of systems analysis, but they plague as well contemporary forms of
reconstructed cost-benefit analysis.
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